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ABSTRACT
It is proposed that young children who already have
some degree of linguistic ability will use various
verbal information-gathering strategies to enhance
that ability. Specifically, it is suggested that
such children formulate hypotheses about the mean-
ings of words and that they use language in various
ways to elicit feedback from others as to the
accuracy of these hypotheses.
A selective review of the literature on cognitive
and language development provided a theoretical
framework within which to pose this problem and from
which guidelines for data analysis could be drawn.
The aim of the study was to identify the use of
various verbal information-gathering strategies in
individual children. This was done by recording
sequences of interactions involving individual
children and various others and then examining the
transcripts of these recordings for regularities
which suggested the use of such strategies.
Verbal information-gathering strategies were thus
initially identified by noting regularities amongst
those interactions where a child appeared to be
seeking information about language. Four such
strategies were found to be used by all three
children who participated in the study. Other
strategies were found to be specific to one indivi-
dual or to two of the children who were siblings.
Once these strategies were identified, the data was
analyzed for individual instances of each strategy.
Discussion of the use of these strategies includes
consideration of the role of questions, selective
imitation, naming or stating and metaphor in lan-
guage development. The relationships among concept
formation, memory and language development are also
briefly explored. Further support for the view of
the young child as testing hypotheses about word
meanings came from the observation that two of the
children showed a definite preoccupation with the
meanings of certain words on various occasions
throughout the study.
While the findings of the study show that these
three children did use various verbal information-
gathering strategies, it remains to be shown how
important such strategies are for language devslop-
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While there has recently been a considerable growth
of interest in the role of adult speech in language
development (Wells and Robinson 1982), fewer studies
have attempted to explore the role played by the
child's own speech. Those studies which have
investigated the child's part in language develop-
ment have tended to focus on language comprehension,
or strategies for processing incoming verbal infor-
mation. Notable exceptions are Nelson (1973), who
looks at both comprehension and production, and
Snyder-McLean and McLean (1977, 1978), who have
attempted to evaluate both (linguistic) information-
processing and information-gathering strategies
(verbal and non-verbal).
The child's role in language development is un-
doubtedly less accessible for study than that of the
adult, but investigation of this aspect is crucial
for an understanding of normal language development
and of any problems or retardation in this area.
So, although language development must always be
situated in the "language-transmission partnership"
(Snyder-McLean and McLean 1978), the focus of this
study was on the active role played by the young
child.
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As far back as eighty years ago theorists were con-
cerned with the question of whether the child's role
in language development was an active or passive
one, although for some time after that the issue lay
dormant. Since Chomsky (1959 cited in Deutsch
1981) challenged the behaviourist view on the mecha-
nisms underlying language development this contro-
versy has come to the fore once more, with many
theorists arguing that the child should be seen as
actively involved in a process of re-invention or
creation of language (Deutsch 1981). Much of the
work stemming from this approach has been concerned
with the way the infant learns to communicate before
he is able to use language to do so, for example The
Guided Re-invention of Language by Lock (1980).
The present study, on the other hand, was concerned
with the child who already has some linguistic abi-
lity, which he uses in various ways to enhance his
mastery of language. It was suggested that the
young child may be seen as formulating and testing
various hypotheses about language in general and
about the meanings of words in particular. The
main hypothesis of the study was that one of the
ways in which the child might achieve this would
be to use various verbal strategies to manipulate
the linguistic environment, thereby eliciting infor-
mative feedback from others. The aim of the study
2
is to establish whether children can be found to use
such strategies, and if so, to identify examples.
A further concern of the study is the question of
individual differences among children in the use of
this type of strategy.
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PART I : THE PROBLEM AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE
CHAPTER ONE
SOME INITIAL STATEMENTS OF THE PROBLEM EXPLORED BY
THE PRESENT STUDY
Before examining the view of the child described in
the Introduction in terms of various theories and
studies in the fields of cognitive development and
the development of language, some initial statements
of the problem will be outlined.
Horgan (1981) presents a collection of spontaneous
jokes from the longitudinal study of one child's
language development. According to Horgan, most of
the jokes presented "are closely related to her
developing language skills and demonstrate early
metalinguistic abilities" (Horgan 1981 : 218). She
categorizes these jokes into four types:
- violations of semantic categories
- phonetic pattern games
- changing established patterns
- riddle-like questions
Focusing on the first type, it appears that Kelly -
described as a "somewhat atypical child", "the
first-born daughter of a philosopher and a psycho-
linguist" - frequently made jokes by violating
semantic categories. In other words, she appeared
to formulate a hypothesis about the boundaries of a
word's meaning, and then use the word in a context
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far outside those boundaries. Her utterance would
be absurd, and therefore humorous. This was
clearly an established pattern of interaction built
up between herself and her caretakers, through which
she could initiate an exchange which would provide
informative feedback about the accuracy of her
interpretation of the word's meaning. Should she
/
be incorrect in her hypothesis, and fail to break
out of the relevant semantic category, the joke
would fail, and no doubt an explanation - or at
least some elaboration - would ensue.
Horgan reports that:
Throughout her development, the acquisition
of a new word would stimulate a joke attempt
of this type. When she was 1;11 I told her
I was proud of her. She correctly surmised
that only people are proud of you. She
used a joke to " s how off" (and to test) her
new knowledge: "Daddy's proud of you.
Grandma's proud of you. Uncle David's
proud of you. Hamburger NOT proud of you.
Ha, ha." Of course, sometimes her analyses
were incorrect and her jokes failed. After
asking me why men could not wear dresses and
contemplating my response about customs, she
concluded that customs were something only
men had. "Daddy has a custom. Uncle David
has a custom. Mommy has a customl Ha, ha,
mommies can't have customs 1 The clock has
a customl Ha, ha, clocks can't have custansl"
(Horgan 1981 : 219)
Horgan suggests that telling jokes in this way is a
very effective strategy for someone learning a 1an-
guage. Having heard a new word, the child formu-
1ates a hypothesis about its semantic restrictions,
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and tests this hypothesis by violating these rest-
rictions. Of course this is a particularly sophis-
ticated and highly individualised type of interac-
tion for such a young child to participate in.
However it does lead to speculation on the possibi-
lity of various similar (though possibly simpler and
more common) types of interaction, as an important
part of the process of language development. This
suggestion would appear to fit in with Snyder-McLean
and McLean's (1978) discussion of information-
gathering strategies. They see the child as making
use of two types of language acquisition strategies,
information-gathering strategies (G-strategies) and
information-pr0gessing strategies (P-strategies).
G-strategies they define as:
those kinds of overt interactive behaviour,
both verbal and nonverbal, that enable the
child to gather from the plethora of linguis-
tic information provided by his environment
that which is necessary and appropriate for
the child's current language learning needs.
(Snyder-McLean and McLean 1978 : 307)
While P-strategies have received a fair amount of
attention in recent studies of language development
(e.g. Slobin 1973), G-strategies appear to have been
less favoured. As Snyder-McLean and McLean point
out, it is generally accepted that language develop-
rnent in the child occurs in the context of inter-
action with competent speakers of language. What
is subject to differences of opinion is the level of
6
contribution assigned to child and adult respec-
tively. So theorists vary in the emphasis they
place on the roles of adult and child in what
Snyder-McLean and McLean call the "language-
transmission partnership". Some believe the
adult's role to be of primary importance and
interest, while others simply see this side of the
interactive process as more accessible to rigorous
investigation. As a result, quite a number of
studies have been carried out to look at such
questions as:
- how mothers maintain "dialogue" with two-
year-01ds (Kaye and Charney 1980)
- the role of adult speech in language
development (Wells and Robinson 1982)
- mother's answers to children's questions:
from socio-economic status to individual
differences (Robinson 1981)
- the special speech style adopted by adults
when talking to children (Snow 1979)
If one believes, as Snyder-McLean and McLean and
presumably Horgan do, that the child must be seen as
an active participant in a language teaching-
learning partnership (Snyder and McLean 1977), then
it becomes clear that it is important to study the
role of the child, not only in reacting to
7
facilitatory behaviour on the part of the adult, but
also in initiating potentially informative patterns
of interaction. And in investigating this aspect
of language development, it is important to keep in
mind the likelihood that there will be marked indi-
vidual differences in the way in which children take
an active role. Just as studies of the adult role
assume individual differences among adults in faci-
litating the child's language learning, so it is
likely that there will be similar individual diffe-
rences among children in eliciting this type of
facilitating behaviour. This is an aspect of lan-
guage development still to be investigated. (Wells
and Robinson 1982)
The need to acknowledge individual differences in
this regard is further highlighted by a considera-
tion of how Horgan, on one hand, and Synder-McLean
and McLean on the other, came to be interested in
this aspect of language development. Horgan
observed a very individualised joking pattern in a
child whom she describes as atypical - a child whose
parents both took a great interest in language and
language development. Kelly was, in fact, exposed
to language games when she was very young, and one
would certainly not expect many children to develop
such a sophisticated mode of verbal interaction at
this early age, if at all. However in describing
8
this rather startling pattern of interaction in one
child, Horgan has opened the way for an investiga-
tion into similar, if less obvious, patterns of
interaction between other children and their careta-
kers. For if Horgan is right in suggesting that
IIthis sort of joke-telling is a very effective stra-
tegy for a language learner 11 (1981 : 219), then it
would be reasonable to look for various strategies
used by other children.
If such strategies could be found, they would be
likely to be of varying degrees of efficiency, which
leads to a reflection on Snyder-McLean and McLean's
interest in this field. Unlike Horgan, these theo-
rists came to the topic from a concern with language
acquisition as it relates to retardation and inter-
vention. Snyder-McLean and McLean (1978) discuss
verbal information-gathering strategies in an
attempt to outline a conceptual framework according
to which language deficiency is to be seen as lI a
process, rather than a product-deficit ll (1978 :
324). The verbal G-strategies outlined by them
fall into two categories:
1. Selective Imitation (spontaneous verbal
imitation)
2. Meta1inguistic Utterance Production - which they
define as encompassing lI any process by which
9
non-imitative expressive language functions as a
means for the child to acquire further
linguistic knowledge. 1I (1978 : 314) Within
this category they propose a continuum of meta-
linguistic utterance types, as follows:
(i) Interrogative utterance production
(lithe most intentional form of meta-
linguistic G-strategyll)
(ii) Hypothesis-testing (referring to
lI utterances which seemed specifically
designed to evoke a confirmation or
correction from a more mature speaker ll )
(iii) Evocative utterance production (a type
.of II s trategy ll characterized by utterances
which lido not necessarily reflect any
such intentionality or even self-
conscious uncertainty, but are nonethe-
less functional in evoking a linguistic
response from a more mature speaker. lI )
(1978 : 318)
10
INTERROGATIVE 11 HYPOTHESIS EVOCATIVE
UTTERANCES TESTING 11 UTTERANCES
WH-QUESTIONS
Example Example Example
Child points to Child points to Child points to
fox at zoo, fox at zoo, fox at zoo,
says: "Wha111 says: IIDoggie~1I says: IIDoggie~1I
Most Least
INTENTIONALITY
figure 1: Proposed continuum of intentionality for
metalinguistic utterance types. Rising and falling
intonation is indicated by direction of arrows.
(Snyder-McLean and McLean 1978 : 315)
Their proposal of the different verbal G-strategies
operating in the course of normal language develop-
ment is a tentative one, and they emphasize that a
great deal of research must be done before the role
of such G-strategies can be established. Apart
from investigating their frequencies of occurrence,
they believe it essential to evaluate their develop-
mental value in the process of language acquisition,
and the nature of the contextual or linguistic
variables controlling their occurrence.
Horgan, too, outlines directions for future re-
search. She suggests various factors which she
believes might account for Kelly's individualised
pattern of joke-telling, including:
- her exposure to and reinforcement for
language games
11
- her advanced metalinguistic knowledge
- cognitive ability, familiarity with jokes,
and attention to language
- being a reflective, rather than an impul-
sive child
- her high tolerance for degraded stimuli
- a tendency to focus attention on patterns
Horgan believes that all the above factors made some
-
contribution to Kelly's spontaneous joke-telling,
and suggests that future research is needed to
investigate such individual variations and how these
relate to humour.
50 Horgan is concerned with explaining the lingui-
stic behaviour of a highly competent user of
language, whereas 5nyder-McLean and McLean hope to
stimulate research into the nature of aberrant
language development, where an understanding of
strategic verbal behaviour could contribute to lan-
guage training programmes. Approaching the issue
from quite different directions, both Horgan, and
5nyder-McLean and McLean acknowledge the tentative
nature of their understanding of the role of such
strategies as are used by children during the course
of language development (and the development of
12
humour - Horgan), and that the nature and efficiency




THE CHILD AS HYPOTHESIS-TESTER: THE ACTIVE
LEARNING ROLE
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The notion of the child as testing hypotheses about
language can be seen as a much broader one than imp-
lied by Snyder-McLean and McLean (1978), who catego-
rize such hypothesis-testing as one type of meta1in-
guistic utterance production. The notion of the
child as hypothesis-tester is in fact central to the
study of the active role played by the child in the
process of language development. For, underlying
any form of confirmation-seeking by the child about
her understanding and use of language is the assump-
tion that she entertains some hypotheses about that
language.
Chomsky (1965, 1976) sees the child as operating on
the basis of various hypotheses about language.
These are hypotheses about the grammatical structure
of language and derive, not from experience, but
from the child's genetic inheritance as a member of
the human species.
Various~bthers see children as formulating and
/ II'
testing hypotheses about the linguistic code and
somewhere in between Chomsky's notion of innate
hypotheses and a behaviourist view of the passive
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learning of language according to the principles of
association lie many and varied views of the child
as an active language learner. One such view is
that of Brown (1958), who proposes a developmental
model referred to as "The Original Word-Game". The
participants in this game are a mature speaker of a
language and a child who is learning that language.
According to the rules of this game, the child
formulates hypotheses about category membership on
the basis of names which the adult (mature speaker)
has given to things. The child then tests these
hypotheses by naming unfamiliar things, an activity
which is monitored by the adult, who provides cor-
rective feedback if the child's understanding of a
category does not appear to fit with her own.
Many theorists today see language learning as
closely linked to the other learning activities of
the child, rather than as dependent on the use of
highly specific language learning skills' {Donaldson
1978) • According to Donaldson:
The primary thing is now held to be the
grasp of meaning - the ability to "make
sense" of things, and above all to make
sense of what people do, which of course
includes what people say. On this view,
it is the child's ability to interpret
situations which makes it possible for
him, through active processes of hypothesis-
testing, to arrive at a knowledge of
language.
(Donaldson 1978 : 38)
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Linking hypothesis-testing and language development
in this way is quite likely to hold for many people
absurd connotations of a formal operational two-
year-old. It is therefore particularly important
to examine carefully what may be implied by these
ideas - to develop them in some detail and to
evaluate the credibility of such an approach. Much
of this will be done in the course of discussing the
findings of the present study. However it is
necessary to look here at how theories and studies
in the field of cognitive development might set a
framework for this view of the language-learning
child.
One general developmental model of learning and per-
formance based on hypothesis-testing principles is
Gholson's (1980) IIhypothesis theory", which he des-
cribes as a synthesis of piaget's structural theory
and information-processing theory. Gholson's work
is actually more limited than such a description of
it would imply, since he tends to look mainly at
older children, in the context of fairly formalized
problem-solving tasks. However the principle of a
synthesis of Piagetian and information-processing
theories is one which has been taken up by many
others, who agree with Gholson's view that Piagetian
or Neo-Piagetian models provide an account of deve-
lopmental change, while information-processing
16
models help to explain how structures, operations
and performance are related. This is because Neo-
piagetian models give a clear account of the
structural basis of operations, which is lacking in
most information-processing models, while the latter
focus on the relationship between executive
functions and performance (Gholson 1980).
Perhaps the most important point about both the
information-processing and Piagetian (or Neo-
Piagetian) approaches is that they view the child as
an active participant in her own cognitive develop-
ment. Taking Donaldson1s assertion that the
mechanisms of language learning are best seen as
closely related to learning mechanisms in general,
together with the assumption of the child as an
active participant in this process, it seems likely
that a comprehensive framework for the explanation
of this participation will include elements of both
information-processing and Piagetian approaches.
There has recently been growing interest in iden-
tifying the cognitive and social prerequisites for
language acquisition. Bates (1979) describes the
independent appearance in the early 1970s of various
theoretical papers, all of which rejected the
autonomous syntax aproach to child language (Bloom
1973, Bruner 1975, Edwards 1973, MacNamara 1972,
17
Ryan 1974, schlesinger 1974, Sinclair 1972, Slobin
1973 - all in Bates 1979).
The key theoretical point in 1960s research
was maintained: The child is viewed as a
hypothesis-tester, an active creator of suc-
cessive "theories" about his particular
language.
(Bates 1979 : 3)
However these theorists introduced quite a new view
of the origins of the child1s first hypotheses about
language. These origins are seen as nonlinguistic
and as lying in the social interactions (Bruner
1975, Schaffer 1977) and sensorimotor development
(as described by Piaget 1952, 1954, 1962) of the
first two years of life.
It is not appropriate for the purposes of the
present study to look at the details of the work on
cognitive and social prerequisites. What could
prove useful is to focus on some of the basic
assumptions and principles of this work in order to
extrapolate from these to the study of language
development during the slightly later developmental
period covered by the present study.
2.2 PIAGETIAN THEORY AND THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE
DEVELOPMENT
As mentioned above, many of these basic assumptions
and ideas have been derived from Piagetian theory.
Kessen and Nelson (1978) go so far as to say that
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the best answer to the question of what the child
brings to language is to be found in the develop-
mental theories of Piaget.
While Piaget was not interested in developing a
theory of language acquisition, his discussion of
the sensorimotor origins of knowledge and the
semiotic function clearly offers important potential
for escape from the situation described by Miller
(1975) when he said:
We have two theories of language acquisition
at the moment ••• the miracle theory or the
impossible theory. (quoted in Gilbert 1978)
Much of the current research on language development
appears to be of a descriptive rather than a theore-
tical nature, probably because the field is one in
. which the nativist-empiricist debate has had a par-
ticularly crippling effect. So it is to be expec-
ted that an attempt to theorize about the mechanisms
or dynamics underlying language development will be
influenced, implicitly or explicitly, by such a
grand-scale developmental theory as Piaget's, espe-
cially in view of his interactionist position.
The most important aspect of this theory, for the
present study, is Piaget's view of the origins and
development of thought as lying in the constructive
interaction of the child and his environment. Cen-
tral to this is the view of the child as active, as
manipulating his environment and thereby coming to
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represent the elements of that environment inter-
nally, whether in terms of actions, images or
sYmbols.
Since piaget stresses the continuity between
sensorimotor action schemes and "verbal schemes"
(e.g. Piaget 1971), his discussion of the way the
preverbal infant sets about acquiring knowledge of
the world could provide some useful insights for an
understanding of the young child's manipulation of
his verbal environment. When Piaget (1962) does
discuss language itself (in Play, Dreams and Imita-
tion in Childhood - or more accurately La Formation
du Symbole chez l'Enfant), he emphasizes the deve-
lopmental interdependence of symbolic play, deferred
imitation, mental imagery and the child's first
verbal utterances.
Nevertheless, it must be remembered that while
Piagetian theory may have much to offer for the
study of language development, it has been left to
others to develop the implications of his ideas in
this direction (e.g. Sinc1air 1972, 1978: Nelson
1973: Bates 1979: Inhe1der & Karmi1off-Smith 1978,
Karmiloff-Smith 1979).
Karmiloff-Smith (1979) argues that, although the
basis of Piaget's theory is the child's logico-
mathematical interaction with the physical
20
environment, IIhis epistemology could embrace equally
I
constructive interaction of the child and his lin-
guistic, social or emotional environments. 1t
(Karmiloff-Smith 1979 : 2) To a certain extent
this is the basis of Bruner's (1975 Cb]) discussion
of the ontogenesis of speech acts, where he suggests
that linguistic concepts are first realized in
action - most importantly in joint activity.
Bruner's work on language development constitutes
an influential synthesis of speech act theory and a
cognitive approach to language development, and will
be referred to again later.
One of the first members of the Genevan School to
explore the implications of Piagetian theory for" an
explanation of language development was Sinclair,
who focused initially on early syntactic develop-
ment. As an example of this work, she describes a
study (Sinclair-de Zwart 1973) in which linguistic
problems of a syntactic nature were put to young
children. The subjects, aged 2~6 to 7 years, were
presented with utterances made up of either two
nouns and a verb in the infinitive, or two verbs and
a noun (in different orders and with different types
of verbs and nouns):
NVN : boy-push-girl ~girl-push-boy
NNV boy-girl-push ~ girl-bay-push
VNN push-boy-girl ~ push-girl-boy
The children were required to guess the meanings of
these utterances, and to illustrate or act out their
meanings with toys. It was Sinclair's belief that
during the first year of life a set of universal
cognitive structures is built up, and that this
provides the child with enough assumptions about the
nature of human language for his first efforts in
communicating with language.
In this sense one could indeed, to quote
Slobin (1971), take Piaget as a handbook
for psycholinguistic development.
(Sinclair-de Zwart 1973 : 11)
The study described above was designed to elicit the
children's use of this set of basic assumptions to
guess the meaning of the utterances. Sinclair
suggests that since the children were thereby expo-
sed to a "language", of which the words were fami-
liar but the syntactial rules unknown, they would
select certain solutions on the basis of their
initial set of hypotheses about the structure of
human language.
The strategies used by the children to reach parti-
cular solutions are interpreted in terms of develop-
mental tendencies. . While the idea of hypotheses
should be noted, the most interesting aspect of
Sinclair's view (as far as the present study is
concerned), is not her notion of a set of basic
assumptions, or "universal base" which is
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constructed during the first one and a half years of
life through the child's actions on reality. This
early period is not of direct interest here, since
Sinclair asserts that during this time it is very
unlikely that learning occurs by means of some form
of inductive generalization from presented linguis-
tic data. What is of particular interest here is
her suggestion that the child whose utterances are
composed of more than three elements must be sup-
posed to be making use of some type of inductive
procedure to enable her to grasp the grammatical
forms and structures of the particular language to
which she is exposed.
Sinclair sees Piagetian theory as being useful on
two counts: firstly in the search for explanatory
adequacy in an attempt "to define the child's ini-
tial set of linguistic universals" (Sinclair-de Zwart
1973 : 13), and secondly in looking at problems of
later language development. She makes it clear
that she believes Piagetian theory to be of greatest
use in the first endeavour. However, it may be
argued that there is considerable explanatory poten-
tial for later language development in the second
"Piagetian postulate" which she puts forward, that
is, the idea that:
23
higher level knowledge involves a recons-
truction of already acquired concepts and
patterns, and thus shows a formation process
isomorphic to that by which earlier knowledge
was acquired.
(Sinclair-de Zwart 1973 : 24)
In discussing the relevance of Piaget's early work
I·
for a semantic approach to language acquisition,
Sinclair (1978 [b]) refers to Le Language et la
Pensee Chez l'Enfant (Piaget 1923, in Sinclair
1978) • She points out that according to Piaget,
questions enable the child to communicate what he
thinks about reality and what he would like to know
about it. Sinclair refers to the "dual aspect of
language, both as an object to be known and asa
means for expressing knowledge" (1978 : 13) and
notes that this is the assumption underlying Klima
and Bellugi's (1966) study of questions. These
theorists see questions as part of the "object to be
known" aspect of language, where language is viewed
as an object with properties and rules to be infer-
red by the child from his experience of it.
Sinclair (1978 [b]) also believes that Piaget's
early work contains some important Observations in
terms of the current growth of interest in semantic
development, and she gives various examples inclu-
ding the following:
24
The teacher and child are looking at a pigeon.
Child: "If you kill him at that bit of his
wing, does he die?"
(Piaget 1923 in Sinclair 1978)
The semantic anomalies in such questions are, accor-
ding to Piaget, indicative of the child's presup-
positions or assumptions about reality.
While this work is concerned mainly with children
from the age of about six years, it does have
relevance for younger children from two and a half
years of age, since this is when Piaget sees the
child as beginning "to distinguish inunediate reality
from something that precedes and underlies this
reality 11 (Sinclair 1978 : 12). According to
Piaget, even the child's initial types of question
(before two and a half or three years) foreshadow
two complementary aspects of the older child's
thought: the search for explanation, and a feeling
for implication (later to develop into logical
thinking) • Piaget draws a direct link between
questions and lithe basic concepts that preside over
the progress of human knowledge" (Sinclair 1978
12). As previously pointed out, Piaget (1959)
(following Claparede 1916) sees these basic concepts
as neither innate nor purely the result of expe-
rience, but rather as constructed out of early
sensorimotor activity by means of biologically based
self-regulation. Claparede, who had a considerable
25
influence on piaget's thought, suggested that as man
came to see his actions as inadequate, so his
thought began to encompass concepts of causality,
time, necessity etc. Piaget's view of the develop-
ment of questions in the child emerging from the
restrictions of sensorimotor thought, is analogous
to these ideas of Claparsde's. (Sinclair 1978 Cb])
Some of Sinclair's most recent work (Verba, Stamback
and Sinclair 1982) looks at the importance of social
exchange amongst a group of children for the process
of learning by acting on the world. It was felt
that in taking up the action of one of the members
of the group, and transforming it into a complex
sequence of related activities, the children were
not passively copying the initial action, but rather
showing what Sinclair et al. term "important capaci-
ties of abstraction" - what was referred to by
Piaget as "reflective abstraction". While this
work again focuses on the age-group just below that
with which the present study is concerned, the view
of the child as performing some kind of analysis on
the actions of others is of relevance.
While there are various details of the work descri-
bed so far which will be useful for an analysis of
the data obtained in the present study, the emphasis
has been on the general way in which the child is
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seen as an active participant in the language learn-
ing process. Karmiloff-Smith (1979) cautions
against seeing sensorimotor action schemes as suf-
ficient explanation for the emergence of language.
Similarly it should be stressed that the analogy
between the way sensorimotor knowledge is acquired,
and the way the young child manipulates her verbal
environment in the search for linguistic and con-
ceptual knowledge, is by no means a comprehensive
one.
There are two issues central to the present study
which would clearly be neglected by a simple focus
on this analogy. These are, a consideration of
individual differences in the mechanisms of language
development, and the importance of the social envi-
ronment or communicative context. There is no
doubt that the focus of approaches such as
Sinclair's, is on universal cognitive structures or
mechanisms underlying language development. This
is only to be expected of a psycholinguistic view
based so closely on Piaget's theory of cognitive
development. However there is a growing emphasis
on group and individual differences in cognitive
development, (e.g. Baron's [1978J paper on intelli-
gence and general strategies) and it is clearly
important for any theory of language development to
allow for the investigation of this possibility.
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Although she does not mention individual differences
as one of them, Sinclair (1973) herself points to
the rapidly increasing number and complexity of
factors which contribute to language development
past the two-element utterance stage. In this
respect her reluctance to advocate the explanatory
potential of Piagetian theory past this stage seems
reasonable.
As far as the social environment and communicative
context are concerned, it has already been mentioned
above that Karmiloff-Smith does not feel that
Piaget1s epistemology excludes these as important
factors in language development. Karmiloff-Smith
(1979) sees prespeech communication as a process
which complements and interacts with prespeech cog-
nition and which develops along with it during
infancy. While Piaget (1971 cited in Karmiloff-
Smith 1979) suggests common underlying mechanisms
for these processes, Karmiloff-Smith allows for the
possibility that an understanding of language deve-
lopment may require looking at what makes these
processes distinct from each other. She even sug-
gests that there may be individual differences
amongst children in their reliance on one or the
other process (although clearly both must be in
operation for language to develop).
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So Karmiloff-Smith can be seen as supplementing and
building out from Piaget's theory in several impor-
tant respects. Apart from her emphasis on pre-
speech communication and the consideration of
individual differences mentioned above, Karmiloff-
Smith (1979) also suggests that Piagetian theory
neglects the potential of the following character-
istics of language:
(i) Its constructive role in development.
(ii) Its capacity for receiving the child's
spontaneous cognitive attention.
Karrniloff-Smith (1979 : 2) points out that
language is usefully to be considered as a
"problem-space per se irrespective of
the specific content of children's utterances
and of their semantic intentions".
(iii) Its function as a relevant experimental
variable in the performance of cognitive
tasks.
The experimental work reported by Karmiloff-Smith
(1979) sets out to investigate these aspects of
language by looking at the functions of certain
linguistic categories in adult speech, and how these
are seen by children of various ages. In this
investigation, Karrniloff-Smith takes a functional
approach, and emphasizes the relevance of Searle's
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theory of speech acts (to be outlined in Chapter
Three). Clearly Piaget did seriously neglect these
aspects of language and language development, and
most of the work done in this field has far fewer
direct links to Piagetian theory than that discussed
so far.
The above review should give some indication of the
potential and inadequacies of Piagetian theory for
an understanding of the mechanisms by which the
child may develop her linguistic knowledge and
ability. It should be mentioned that it is not
appropriate to the present study to review the
relationship between cognitive development and child
language in general. As Carnpbell (1979) points
out, this is currently a very speculative field.
Reviews of the work in this field can be found in
Bowerman (1976) and Cromer (1974, 1976). other
influential theorists in this area include
Macnamara (e.g. Macnamara 1977), H.H. Clark and
E.V. Clark (Clark and Clark 1977, E.V. Clark 1973,
1977, H.H. Clark 1973). The two aspects of this
problem which do need to be developed here are a
framework for viewing the young child as an active
hypothesis-tester, and different approaches to se-
mantic and conceptual development. The latter will
be reviewed in Chapter Four.
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2.3 WHAT MOTIVATES THE QUEST FOR LINGUISTIC
KNOWLEDGE?
To continue, then, with developing a view of the
child as formulating and testing hypotheses about
language, one of the most fundamental questions,
which has so far only been approached indirectly, is
what motivates the young child to work towards
greater linguistic knowledge and ability.
This is in 1tself an extremely complex problem which
is not particularly illuminated by such arguments as
Donaldson's:
••• there is a fundamental human urge to
be effective, competent and independent,
to understand the world and to act with
skill.
(Donaldson 1978 : 113)
Nevertheless some version of this argument is essen-
tial if one wishes to reject the view of the child
as sUbject to simple stimulus-response mechanisms or
as reacting according to a pattern of reinforcements
founded in basic physiological "drives". There is
in fact considerable evidence for the view expressed
by Donaldson, and even infants as young as three to
four months appear to show signs of pleasure at
recognizing or (" understanding") certain objects or
events (Flavell 1977).
It appears to be very rewarding for young children,
as well as adults, to reach an understanding of
something, especially after having had to put a
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considerable amount of cognitive effort into doing
so. Success in aChieving such cognitive mastery is
characteristically accompanied by signs of tension
release and pleasure:
••• part of the motivation intrinsic to
cognitive functioning is the motivation
to master problematic situations, to be
effective with respect to one's environ-
ment, to be competent. It is widely
believed that this aspiration toward
mastery, effectiveness and competence
is an important part of the cognitive
system's power source.
(Flavell 1977 : 22)
When Flavell (1977) turns to discussing language
development in particular, he comments on the "truly
extraordinary" linguistic progress which takes place
during the early childhood period. He emphasizes
the role of the child's increasing linguistic
ability in learning about the world from others,
part of which is the ability to transmit information
to others, thereby eliciting corrective feedback
about the accuracy of her beliefs and ideas.
view of the young child as using language to
This
"receive, transmit and otherwise manipulate informa-
tion about the world" (Flavell 1977 : 63) is central
to the present study which regarded the child as
doing so not only in the pursuit of knowledge in
general, but also, more particularly, in the pursuit
of knowledge about language itself.
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2.4 AN INFORMATION-PROCESSING PERSPECTIVE
It is in an attempt to understand how this might
take place (rather than why), that an information-
processing perspective becomes particularly useful.
The most important concept from which to begin the
construction of such a framework is surely still
that of the TOTE (Test-Operate-Test-Exit) unit pro-
posed by Miller, Galanter and Pribram in 1960.
As Posner (1973) points out, some form of sequential
organization of mental operations is crucial to any
problem-solving process, and according to the TOTE
concept, this is done by matching a present input
against a goal state. If the match is imperfect,
an operation will be performed to attempt to achieve
a representation which does match that of the goal.
In the process of solving any type of cognitive
problem (everyday or formalized), the sequence of
~OTE units involved is said to form a plan. The
well-known example given by Miller et al. is the
plan for hammering in a nail.
As far as the study of language development is con-
cerned, Chomsky (Miiler and Chomsky 1963) accepts
that language comprehension, production and acqui-
sition could in principle be described in terms of
the TOTE framework. Various other investigators of
language development have actually used the TOTE
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formalism: for example Gilbert, who states the
assumption that "TOTE hierarchies are required to be
able to account for even moderately complex
behaviour" (Gilbert 1978 : 42). The introduction
of the TOTE unit may be seen as a major advance in
the analysis of intentional behaviour. For in
applying cybernetic concepts to this analysis it was
shown that cognitive models need not be hampered by
the problem of consciousness (Greenfield 1980).
Information-processing analyses of the organization
of thought and behaviour have become much more
complex since 1960, and the concept of TOTE hierar-
chies is often replaced by some form of network
analysis. Theorists such as K1ahr and Wa11ace
(1976) have drawn up sophisticated information-
processing models of cognitive development, but the
focus of such models tends to be on attention,
perception and memory, rather than on language.
Any attempt to understand how cognitive plans may be
operating in testing hypotheses about language, must
consider the role of memory in this activity. Any
plan will put a load on memory and even when a well
thought-out plan is represented in sequential form
in long-term memory, difficulty may still be experi-
enced in representing it· in "active memory" (Posner
1973 : 162). As far as language development is
concerned, G.M. Olson (1973) suggests that there are
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developmental differences in language acquisition
strategies and that these differences may be related
to developmental changes affecting both short-term
and long-term memory, although he chooses to focus
on short-term or immediate memory.
There has recently been a considerable amount of
dissatisfaction with the typical modal or multistore
model of memory as put forward by theorists such as
Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) and Waugh and Norman
(1965). One of the primary objections to this
model is its rigid distinction between short-term
and long-term memory, and one of the most influen-
tial alternatives to this dichotomy is the concept
of working memory put forward by Baddeley (Baddeley
and Hitch 1974, Baddeley 1976). Working memory (or
active memory) receives input in the form of
incoming information from the senses, as well as
information activated from long-term memory. It is
therefore within working memory that cognitive tasks
such as recognition and hypothesis-testing are said
to be carried out. In terms of the TOTE concept,
it would be here that the representation of a
present stimulus would be matched against a repre-
sentation of the goal state, and here that inform-
ation would be manipulated to guide the hypothesis-
testing process proposed in the present study.
35
Case (1980), in discussing the underlying mechanisms
of intellectual development, refers to the connec-
tion between working memory and the development of
language. He suggests that in order for a child to
produce an utterance commanding (or requesting) an
adult to do something, it must be possible for the
necessary schemes to be assembled in working memory
simultaneously. According to Case, working memory
will be inadequate for this task until towards the
end of the sensorimotor period. This argument is
similar to that put forward by Bates (1976 in Case
1980), in discussing the transition from sensori-
motor to symbolic thought. Here the imperative use
of language, or the use of language to achieve an
end, is said to depend on the child's realizing that
one object can" be used to obtain another - a reali-
zation which both Bates and Case believe is attained
just prior to the transition from sensorimotor to
symbolic thought.
2.5 A STUDY OF LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT OF PARTICULAR
IMPORTANCE FOR THE PRESENT STUDY :
NELSON (1973)
In Case's work, as well as in much of the other work
discussed so far, one can see clearly the integra-
tion of the information-processing and Piagetian
(or Neo-Piagetian) approaches. However perhaps the
best example of such an integration - or at least
the most relevant in this context - is Nelson's work
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on "Structure and Strategy in Learning to Talk ll
(Nelson 1973). In fact Nelson's work is much more
than an integration of these two approaches, as it
incorporates both aspects previously mentioned as
lacking in the Piagetian tradition, that is, a
concern with individual differences, and with the
social context in which the child develops language.
In this study Nelson identifies five strategies
which children use in acquiring first words, and
examines the effectiveness of each. As a framework
for the interpretation of her findings she presents
what she describes as an interaction model inter-
relating the child's preverbal concepts and acqui-
sition strategies, and parental acceptance patterns.
Like the present study, Nelson's work views the
child as a problem solver, although her focus is on
the acquisition of first words during the second
year of life, rather than on the expansion of lin-
guistic knowledge during the third and fourth years.
Also shared by the present study is Nelson's concern
with language learning in the context of the child's
development and environment. More specifically, in
seeing the child as an active information processor,
model builder and problem solver, Nelson's assump-
tions detailed here are shared by the present
author:
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(i) The structures and processes relating to pre-
verbal development are not distinct from
those involved in later linguistic develop-
ment, since development as a whole is seen
as a continuous process.
(ii) The child is actively involved in processing
information from the environment, encoding
this information in terms of perceptual or
conceptual features, and storing it in memory
over the short or long term.
(iii) The child organizes this encoded information
into perceptual-conceptual constructs
(schemata, concepts or constructs).
(iv) liThe human organism acts on the basis of a
hypothetical model of the world based on
expectations derived from his constructions
at any given point in time. This model is
built up over time, is constantly tested, and
constantly changes and develops. Strategies
of information processing and hypothesis-
testing are the basic processes by which the
child makes contact with reality and brings
his world view into harmony with the physical
and social world around him."
(Nelson 1973 : 3)
(v) Since cognitive functions are interrelated
and therefore cannot be understood in isola-
tion, language development must be studied in
the context of the child1s knowledge of his
physical and social world.
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Nelson outlines a four-component process model (see
Figure 2), where parental selection mechanisms
interact with the child's learning or processing
mechanisms in working towards the goal of matching




















Figure 2: Components of the interaction system
(Nelson 1973 : 4)
The distinction between strategies for acquisition
of language and those for the processing of language
is an important one. Nelson names production,
comprehension, imitation, repetition (or self-
imitation) and question asking as the five strate-
gies under study, but specifically states that this
is not intended as an exhaustive list.
While comprehension (essentially a strategy of
selective attention) does not fall within the scope
of the present study, the other four strategy types
clearly do. In particular the concept of produc-
Part II.
tion as a language learning strategy covers the
various forms of hypothesis-testing suggested in
Nelson sees this as a testing or experi-
mental strategy where the child's conceptions of
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words or groups of words are tested for acceptance
or rejection by others, i.e. in the context of
interaction.
An important part of Nelson1s study is her evalua-
tion of the effectiveness of different strategies
used by child and parent, emphasizing the importance
of recognizing individual differences in both, and
their implications for the development of language
in the child. In order to integrate her findings,
Nelson (l973) introduces an interaction model which
is based on the model outlined in Figure 2 above
(see Figure 3).
In this model both the child1s strategies and those
of the parents are regarded as interpretative
mechanisms. At any particular time both the
child1s cognitive structure and the strategies which
the parents are using at that time, will act on the
child1s strategies, which in turn serve to interpret
this cognitive structure and the parental strate-
gies. Reorganization resulting in the position at
T comes about through feedback on this initial
2
interchange and the new cognitive structure (2)
gives rise to revised child strategies (2). This
revised set of child strategies is then acted on by









































Figure 3: Schematic model of the interactive
language-learning process
(Nelson 1973 : 96)
Nelson (1973) applies this model to the explanation
of how an initial productive vocabulary may be con-
structed, but the main relevance of the model for
the present study lies in its emphasis on the
interactive nature of the language-learning process.
While this aspect was not considered in detail in
the present study, its importance for a full under-
standing of the dynamics of language development
cannot be overemphasized.
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2.6 WHAT IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE CHILD
It is important to examine carefully just what is
being attributed t.o a child when it is suggested
that he uses various strategies to learn more about
language. For this reason the concept of strategy
itself will be discussed in this section, as well as
the concepts of intentionality and metalinguistic
awareness. Finally a distinction will be made
between the desire to communicate and the desire for
mastery of conceptual and linguistic knowledge.
2.6.1 STRATEGY
The above outline of Nelson1s work shows clearly her
reliance on the notion of "strategy", a term which
is also used by Horgan, Snyder-McLean and McLean,
and many other theorists interested in the active
role played by the child in the language learning
process. In fact Cromer (1976) suggests that this
term came into regular use in language development
studies as a direct result of the growing trend (in
the 1960s and early 1970s) away from the view of
language acquisition as dependent on passive res-
ponding to differential frequencies of linguistic
input and reinforcement.
Cromer (1976) gives a comprehensive review of
studies investigating developmental strategies for
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language, but it soon becomes clear that most of the
work has dealt with strategies for interpreting in-
coming linguistic information. This is quite a
different focus from that of the present study, as
well as much of Nelson's work, both of which are
more concerned with what Snyder-McLean and McLean
call information-gathering strategies. However
the work reviewed by Cromer and the present study
are both concerned with the active learning of
language, and it is interesting to look at Cromer's
critical evaluation of the usefulness of the concept
of strategy for an understanding of this process.
He concludes that it has been useful in various res-
pects, for example bringing to the fore the impor-
tance of individual differences and of underlying
cognitive operations in language development.
However his final conclusion is that "the concept of
language acquisition strategies has told us much -
except how the child acquires language" (Cromer
1976 : 353).
This rather bleak conclusion suggests that the
concept of strategy is perhaps not as neat a
description of various forms of "observed develop-
mental language behaviour" (Cromer 1976), as it
might at first appear. In order to evaluate the
notion of strategy more clearly it may be useful to
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look at various definitions, beginning with Cromer's
own rather terse statement:
A strategy describes regularities observed
in decision-making.
(Cromer 1976 : 305)
A strategy is a method of controlling and
manipulating information. It may reflect
a genetically based predisposition, or it
may be learned in the course of organism-
environment interaction.
(Nelson 1973 : 35)
A strategy refers to a pattern of decisions
in the acquisition, retention, and utilization
of information that serves to meet certain
objectives, i.e., to insure certain forms of
outcome and to insure against certain others.
(Bruner, Goodnow and Austin 1956 : 54-55)
Bruner, Goodnow and Austin (1956) also refer to
strategies as rules or plans for choosing steps in
problem solving, and suggest that they may be iden-
tified as regularities in decision-making.
Whenever cognitive1y oriented psychologists
search for what they call strategies of
language learning and retention, they often
could just as well be using the term learning
set.
(Moerk 1977 : 18)
Bever (1970) looks at three aspects of cognition:
basic capacities, behavioural strategies and epis-
temo1ogica1 structures, and suggests that:
In both perceptual and productive behaviour,
children and adults utilize many systems of
behavioural strategies to short-cut the
internal structure implied by the regulari-
ties in their behaviour.
(Bever 1970 : 282)
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Bever is also concerned with the acquisition of stra-
tegies for perceiving and producing sentences, and
identifies the following:




Clearly the concept of strategy has broadened in
scope since its use by Bruner, Goodnow and Austin
(1956) in the explanation of formalized problem
solving, and with this appears to have come a lack
of precision in its definition. Many authors no
longer attempt to define the term at all, or more
importantly, to stipulate the sense in which they
are using it:
••• the concept of strategy is a particu-
larly cogent one in the study of cognitive
and perceptual development, but ••• the
hypothesis of 'strategy' as an intervening
construct demands strict attention to
method and theory.
(Sharratt 1980)
For the purposes of the present study, the most
important aspect of the concept is the distinction
between strategies and the fixed aspects of cog-
nition (Sharratt 1980). This distinction may be
elaborated by reference to Atkinson and Shiffrin's
(19G8) modal model of memory, where the structural
features of episodic memory are distinguished from
its control processes. Structural (or fixed)
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aspects of cognition are those information-
processing sequences which are relatively stable and
outside the voluntary control of the individual.
Control processes, on the other hand, are selected
and employed by the individual on the basis of his
interpretation of his current situation and its
demands (Lachman, Lachman and Butterfield 1979).
These voluntary control processes are more generally
referred to as cognitive "strategies". Since
the concept of strategy entails this distinction
between the relatively fixed and the more dynamic
aspects of cognition, it provides a useful tool for
understanding individual differences in cognitive
development and specifically in the way information
is controlled and manipulated to facilitate language
development.
As far as language development is concerned, the
child may use strategies for processing incoming
linguistic information (comprehension strategies)
and strategies for using language (production
strategies). As mentioned above in discussing
Cromer's (1976) review, the focus of the present
study was on the latter type of strategy. The use
of this type of strategy to test hypotheses about
language has certain similarities to the more formal
types of hypothesis-testing investigated by such
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theorists as Bruner, Goodnow and Austin (1956) and
Wason and Johnson-Laird (e.g. Johnson-Laird and
Wason 1977, Johnson-Laird 1972, Wason 1968).
studies typically involve adult sUbjects in a
These
problem-solving task (usually a concept identifi-
cation task), where the sUbjects verbalize their
hypotheses and modify them on the basis of feedback
from the investigator or the task environment.
The terms "hypothesis", "strategy" and "control
process" all have definite connotations of some form
of conscious awareness on the part of the individual
entertaining those hypotheses, or utilizing certain
strategies. The literature (and this review) is
full of such connotations, for example in the state-
ment that:
Children play an active role in the acqu1s1-
tion of meaning by building plausible inter-
pretations for words and utterances from what
they know and from cues in the inunediate
context. In doing this, they appear to
start with two assumptions about the function
and content of language
(Clark and Clark 1977)
Clark and Clark go on to suggest that children use
their existing conceptual knowledge of the world to
form hypotheses about particular word meanings.
From these hypotheses they derive strategies for
using and understanding the words. On the basis of
feedback from others, a strategy or "rule" will be
adjusted until it fits into the adult model.
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The above example is typical of the literature in
its connotations of the young child, not only as
actively participating in her own language develop-
ment, but as somehow deliberately plotting each
step. It may well be that this manner of speaking
is simply a result of the liberation of develop-
mental studies from the strictures of "objective"
terminology and operational definitions of beha-
viour. Certainly an approach which takes account
of the role of intentions and the interpretative
value of reasons in the study of behaviour has more
to offer than a "positivistic", "causal" psychology
which fails to do so (Greenfield 1980). However in
rejecting operational definitions one re-introduces
the question of conscious awareness (as mentioned
above in relation to the concept of strategy), and
the related problem of intentionality. It is a
short step from here to the "morass" which Bruner
(1975 : 262) suggests will arise from trying to
establish whether something is consciously intended.
2.6.2 INTENTIONS
The problem of the attribution of intentions is an
extremely complex philosophical issue with important
implications for the psychology of action and the
psychology of language. The issue of conscious
awareness and intentionality is a particularly
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difficult one for the study of language development,
as Sinclair (1978 [a]) makes clear in her discussion
of conceptualization and awareness in Piaget's
theory and its relevance to the child's conception
of language. The piagetian position_on awareness
which is outlined by Sinclair (1980) implies that,
since utterances are seen as belonging to the cate-
gory of intentional acts, the aim and results of any
utterance should be conscious. According to Sin-
clair, the difficulty here lies in identifying the
aims and results of speech acts, especially in the
case of young children. Her argument rests on the
idea that verbal activity is different in various
important ways from other forms of intelligent acti-
vity (one such difference is the lack of an obvious
boundary between subject and object in verbal
activity).
Greenfield (1980) examines in some depth the concept
of intentionality as it relates to early child lan-
guage. Specifically she is concerned with the
attempt to operationalize intention in terms of an
analysis of conversational discourse in particular,
and the sequential aspect of interaction behaviour
in general.
In the search for an operational definition of
intention Greenfield turns to Searle, and to Bruner,
who suggest two similar candidates (these appear to
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be general references, as Greenfield does not note
specific dates}:
(i) directedness (Searle) or II sustained direction
of behaviour during deployment of means ll
(Bruner)
(ii) presentation or representation of conditions
of satisfaction (Searle) or II s top order
defined by an end state ll (Bruner).
Perhaps most useful for an understanding of how the
concept of intention can be applied to very young
children, is the notion of lIintention-in-action ll ,
proposed by Searle and taken up by Greenfield
(1980). In most models of intention, as in the
TOTE model, the individual has some representation
of the conditions of satisfaction to work towards
and to match the present outcome against. The
implication of intention-in-action is that the
individual need not have any such explicit repre-
sentation; rather lithe conditions of satisfaction
are implicitly present during the intentional
action" Greenfield 1980 : 262). Whereas the adult
is capable of both prior intention and intention-
in-action, only the latter can be attributed to the
sensorimotor infant. In this way it may be pos-
sible to use the concept of intention in the attempt
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to understand the young child's language
development.
One option for the present study might have been to
argue that the notion of intention was an unneces-
sary complication in attributing the use of verbal
information-gathering strategies to young children.
The notions of directedness and conditions of satis-
faction could have been adopted simply as indices of
the active nature of the child's involvement in the
language learning process, which might then have
been explained simply in terms of plans or purpose-
ful behaviour. It may well be that the question of
"conscious intent" and when it can first be attri-
buted to the child, is not a useful one to ask.
Consciousness and intention are "opaque" concepts,
and a more appropriate question may be that of how
communicative functions are shaped and fulfilled.
It even seems that as one studies how specific
communicative functions develop, the question of
conscious intent and when it first arises, falls
away (Bruner 1975 [a]).
Nevertheless, the position taken by the present
author did not depend on setting aside the notion of
intention, but rather on making a clear distinction
between intention and consciousness. This distinc-
tion is stressed by Searle (1983 : 2) who suggests
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that IIIntentionality is not the same as conscious-
ness ll • He defines Intentionality in terms of
directedness, and notes that intentions are simply
one form of Intentionality, as is meaning.
(Beliefs, hopes and fears may be just as directed as
intentions.)
In the present study, then, the notion of conscious
intention was considered misleading, in the sense
that consciousness and Intentionality overlap only
partially (Searle 1983). The notion of intention
(as an aspect of Intentionality) was, however,
retained, and was considered to be a useful con-
ceptual tool for investigating hypothesis-testing
and the use of verbal information-gathering
strategies by the young child.
2.6.3 METALINGUISTIC AWARENESS
A third "problem ll concept which is closely related
to the issues of strategy use and intentionality is
that of metalinguistic awareness. Like the term
"strategy", "metalinguistic" is one which is seen
more and more frequently in the language development
literature (for example Horgan, and Snyder-McLean
and McLean, see Chapter One above). As with
"strategy", "metalinguistic" appears to be used in
various different senses, often without clear
definition. Even where definition is provided, it
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is clear that different authors have very different
views on the scope of this concept:
[The development of metalinguistic aware-
ness is] the development of children's
ability to reflect on language as an object.
(Smith and Tager-Flusberg 1982 : 449)
[Metalinguistic awareness is the awareness]
of language as something that can be turned
around on itself, played and joked with,
and used as a tool in lying, in reasoning,
and in memory.
(de Villiers and de Villiers 1978 : 165)
[Metalinguistics is] a term used by some
linguists for the study of language in
relation to other aspects of cultural
behaviour.
(Crystal 1977, quoted in Kreckel 1981 : l29)
In general, the metalinguistic ability of
native speakers pertains to their capacity
to report what is accomplished by context-
dependent speech.
(Kreckel 1981 : l29)
For a start let us suppose that metalingui-
stic awareness includes the ability to
think about language and comment on it.
(Read 1978 : 65)
Hakes (1980) sees metalinguistic abilities as those
abilities which make possible "linguistic intui-
tions", that is, the reflection on and evaluation of
utterances.
Perhaps most indicative of the differences in the
various versions of the metalinguistic concept are
the different estimates of the age at which such
abilities are first evident. Slobin (1978) sees
the two-year-old's self-corrections and rephrasings
of utterances as indicative of one "level" of
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meta1inguistic awareness, whereas de Vi11iers and
de Vi11iers (1978) are reluctant to interpret
apparent lIawarenessll of language as truly metalin-
guistic much before the age of five years. They
caution that the child may appear to be using
I ru1es" for the comprehension and production of
speech for some months, or possibly years, before
meta1inguistic awareness can actually be said to be
present.
The question seems to be whether one regards meta-
linguistic ability as developing along a continuum
from the early days of language use, or whether one
sees it as a qualitatively new ability which only
appears at a later stage. 510bin (1978), represen-
ting the first position, sees the development of the
individual's awareness of language as part of her
overall development of consciousness and se1f-
consciousness, and suggests different levels of
meta1inguistic ability, from lithe dimly conscious or
preconscious speech monitoring which underlies se1f-
correction, to the concentrated, analytic work of
the linguist." (51obin 1978 : 45)
Again one could argue that, at the first level with
which the present study would be most concerned, the
term lImeta1inguistic" could prove to be a.comp1ica-
ting factor rather than a useful conceptual tool.
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The distinction between the concepts of meta-
cognitive awareness and cognitive strategy is often
blurred. Recognition of this probably underlies
de Villiers and de Villiers' (1978) "caution" ex-
pressed above. Flavell, who has been largely
responsible for the growth of interest in meta-
cognition in general, stresses the difference
between cognitive strategies which he sees as being
brought into play in order to make cognitive
progress, and metacognitive strategies which may
monitor that progress (Flavell 1979). However he
also acknowledges that strategies may take on either
role, depending on the context and purpose of their
use.
Clearly this is by no means a simple concept to
apply in the study of later language development, at
an age when there is general agreement as to its
validity, and one should be extremely wary of using
it to describe the "dimly conscious or preconscious
speech monitoring" of the young child. The impor-
tant point is the fairly general acknowledgment of
some form of language awareness and speech monitor-
ing during the third and fourth years of life.
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2.6.4 THE DESIRE TO COMMUNICATE AND THE DESIRE FOR
MASTERY OF CONCEPTUAL AND LINGUISTIC
KNOWLEDGE
In seeking to clarify what is being attributed to
the child, another distinction suggested above was
that between the desire to communicate and the
desire for mastery of conceptual and linguistic
knowledge. This relates to the controversial
issue of whether language evolved primarily to
enable humans to communicate with each other, or to
augment human intellectual capacity. As far as the
ontogenesis of language in the child is concerned,
de Vi11iers and de Vi11iers (1978) believe that
these two functions of language may be inseparable.
So far the focus of this discussion has been prima-
ri1y on establishing a cognitive framework for the
present study. It is now high time to turn to the




THE COMMUNICATIVE CONTEXT OF LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT
3.1 INTRODUCTION
It was pointed out above that recent trends in the
study of language development include an interest in
the social prerequisites for language acquisition,
as well as in the cognitive prerequisites (Bates
1979). This reflects a general growth of interest
in the social context of language which may be seen
as arising from two directions: an interest in lan-
guage on the part of theorists concerned with social
psychology, and a recognition of the importance of
the social context on the part of cognitive
theorists and psycho1inguists.
Language is seen as one aspect of the broader pheno-
menon of communication, and the development of lan-
guage as dependent on the prior development of
communicative ability in the infant (e.g. Bruner
1975, Lock 1980). The unit of analysis is most
commonly the mother/child dyad, and the most frequ-
ently used analytic framework is that of Speech Act
Theory (Austin 1962, Sear1e 1969).
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activity and is therefore something that children
learn to do. The mother interprets the infant's
initially innately organized activity as having
meaning and acts accordingly. The infant learns
that certain of his movements elicit particular
responses in his mother (caretakers) and in this way
comes to be capable of actions as opposed to sequ-
ences of (biologically controlled) movements
(Shotter 1977).
This focus on meaning as something people do, points
to the issue of the function of communication. The
work of Karmiloff-Smith (1979), referred to in
Chapter Two, is conducted within a functional app-
roach to language, as is that of many other investi-
gators, for example Halliday (1975) and McShane
(1980) •
3.2 PRAGMATICS
The study of the effects of context on the use and
interpretation of language is often referred to
under the heading of "pragmatics", although af?
Levinson (1983) points out, this is a very difficult
term to define accurately.
Initially seen as an aspect of semiotics (the
science of signs), along with syntactics and seman-
tics, pragmatics was defined as the study of the
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relation of signs to interpreters (Morris 1938,
quoted in Levinson 1983). However today there are
many different definitions, none of them conclusive,
and to describe pragmatics as the study of language
usage is a deceptive simplification (Levinson 1983).
Perhaps one useful distinction which can be made
among the different approaches to pragmatics relates
to those theorists who regard this field as one of
several distinct and separable levels of language,
as opposed to those who see it as the most important
and determining aspect of language (the function-
alist approach). Alternatively, one may take a
middle line, and study the influence of pragmatic
factors on phonology, morphQlogy, syntax and seman-
tics, as well as viewing pragmatics as a field of
interest in its own right (Lund and Duchan 1983).
A useful distinction found within pragmatics is that
between sentence-meaning and speaker-meaning (or
utterance meaning), derived from the philosopher
Grice1s (1968) notion of non-natural meaning
(meaning-nn). This latter type of meaning refers
to intentional communication, where:
S meant-nn z by uttering U if and only if:
(i) S intended U to cause some effect z
in recipient H
(ii) S intended (i) to be achieved simply
by H recognizing that intention (i).
(in Levinson 1983)
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The implication of this is that communication is a
unique type of intentional activity which can be
judged as successful or unsuccessful on the basis of
whether or not the intention is recognized. The
important criterion is that of mutual awareness or
knowledge between speaker and hearer, such that both
are aware of the speaker's intention, and each is
aware that the other has this knowledge. What
Levinson refers to as "Grice's essential insight" is
that the speaker's meaning need not bear a close
relation to the meaning of U, or sentence-meaning.
Levinson (1983) advocates that meaning-nn be taken
as the scope of meaning for the purpose of defining
pragmatics, as this -accounts for aspects such as
irony, metaphor and indirect implications, while
excluding unintended inferences.
In the context of language development and espe-
cially in the study of the transition from pre-
linguistic to linguistic communication, "pragmatics"
most commonly refers to lithe directive function of
speech through which speakers affect the behaviour
of others in trying to carry out their intentions"
(Bruner 1978 : 44).
3.3 SPEECH ACT THEORY
The framework which Bruner (1975, 1978) and many
others have adapted to the study of this transition
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to linguistic communication is based on the uses of
communication as speech acts. sear1e (1969) sug-
gests that speaking a language is a rule-governed
intentional behaviour, and he refers to this beha-
viour as the performance of speech acts. Further-
more, he asserts that one cannot in principle
separate the study of the meanings of sentences from
the study of the performances of speech acts, but
notes that it is necessary to make a distinction
between what a speaker means and what effects he
intends to produce in his hearers.
Different types of speech act outlined by sear1e
(1969) include:
(i) Utterance acts: the uttering of words,
morphemes or sentences.
(ii) Propositiona1 acts: referring and pre-
dicating.
(iii) I110cutionary acts, e.g. stating, quest-
ioning, commanding and promising.
In addition he brings in Austin's notion of the per-
10cutionary act, which refers to the consequences of
il10cutionary acts, or their effects on the actions,
thoughts or beliefs of their hearers. For example,
in stating something one might convince one's
hearer, where convincing him would constitute the
per10cutionary act. Searle emphasizes that the
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different types of speech act are not simply acts
which occur simultaneously, nor do they stand in
relation to each other as means to ends. Rather it
should be seen that in performing an illocutionary
act one will also be performing propositional and
utterance acts and quite probably a perlocutionary
act. Furthermore, the relation of utterance acts
to propositional and illocutionary acts is likened
to the relation between putting a cross on a ballot
paper and the act of voting (Searle 1969).
The notion of an illocutionary act (or the illocu-
tionary force of an utterance) is a useful one in
evaluating many types of communication. However
the illocutionary force of an utterance is dependent
on the meaning of the sentence spoken, since it is
through the conventions or rules of language that
the illocutionary effect operates. For this reason
the notion of the illocutionary act has limited
value in the case of communication between adults
and young children who are just learning to match
intentions and linguistic structures (McShane 1980).
Even in more mature speakers it seems essential to
allow for instances where the speaker's meaning need
not bear a close relation to the sentence-meaning of
his utterance. After all, there must be other fac-
tors governing understanding in communication, even
if these are "conventions" shared only by two
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people, such as a mother and her child, or a pair of
twins.
This is certainly likely to be the case where the
child is using communicative strategies for gather-
ing further information about language. The cues
which enable the hearer to understand and to respond
appropriately by providing informative feedback, are
likely to be more subtle and complex than an analy-
sis of the conventions of language would convey.
This point may be made clearer by considering that
such strategies are not likely to be equally effec-
tive when used in interaction with familiar and
unfamiliar adults. Since the strategies will have
developed in interaction between the child and his
caretakers, they will probably be most effective in
eliciting feedback from those caretakers. This is
because the utterances employed in exercising a
particular strategy are unlikely to depend entirely
on the standard conventions of language to achieve
their effect, but may rather do so on the basis of
various subtle contextual cues which have come to be
understood by both child and caretaker/s as signal-
ling a request for informative feedback. Of course
these strategies must be based in some way on lin-
guistic conventions, or they would function only in
interaction with the child's caretakers. Neverthe-
less Grice's (1968) account of meaning does appear
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better able to accommodate the ideas investigated by
the present study than Searle1s (1969) notion of
illocutlonary force might do.
3.4 GRICE AND MEANING
The full expression of Grice1s schema IIU meant (non-
naturally) something by uttering XII is IIFor some
,
audience A, U intended his utterance of x to produce
in A some effect (response) E, by means of Als
recognition of that intention ll • This notion that
IIU intends to produce in A effect E by means of Als
recognition of that intention ll is abbreviated by
Grice to IIU M-intends to produce in A effect Ell,
where IIM" stands for IImeaningll (Grice 1968 : 230).
Grice (1968) revises his earlier account of the M-
intended effect for indicative-type and imperative-
type utterances as follows:
Imperative-type utterances
M-intended effect:
that the hearer should intend to do
something (with, of course, the ulterior
intention on the part of the utterer




that the hearer should think that the
utterer believes something.
(Grice 1968 : 230)
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Although this theory of meaning-nn is not usually
viewed as linked to Grice's theory of imp1icature,
there is in fact a fundamental connection between
the two. For just as the theory of meaning-nn
indicates how communication may be successful with-
out relying on linguistic conventions, so it allows
for the communication of more than just the informa-
tion contained in the sentence-meaning (Levinson
1983)'.
- Imp1icature is described by Lyons (1981) as a notion
introduced into the philosophy of language (and
adopted by linguistics) to provide a link between
the logical notions of implication and entailment,
and the more general notion of implication.
Grice's theory of imp1icature may be seen as a
theory concerned with the way people use language
(Levinson 1983). Important to this theory is the
notion of the efficient co-operative use of 1an-
guage. The general co-operative principle may be
expressed as follows:
make your contribution such as is required,
at the stage at which it occurs, by the
accepted purpose or direction of the talk
exchange in which you are engaged.
(Grice 1975 : 45) .
Grice refers to two types of imp1icature, conven-
tiona1 and conversational. Conventional imp1i-
cature depends on something over and above that
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which is truth-conditional in the conventional use
or meaning of a form or expression, while conversa-
tional implicature is based on those (more general)
principles regulating the proper conduct of
conversation (Lyons 1981).
From his consideration of Grice's notion of conver-
sational implicature, Lyons (1981) goes on to point
out the dual role of context: context of situation
and contextual information shared between speaker
and hearer. By taking account of both of these,
one may reach an accurate interpretation of the
speaker's utterance. For example, the hearer may
decide on the basis of the context of situation that
a certain utterance is intended metaphorically.
Having decided this, he can then consider the-con-
textual information which he shares with the
speaker, and in this way come to understand what is
meant by the utterance, over and above its sentence-
meaning.
These notions of context of situation and contextual
information shared by speaker and hearer are very
important for the type of analysis undertaken in the
present study. For just as the hearer may take
account of both of these to reach an accurate inter-
pretation of the speaker's utterance, so may the
investigator of child language who is, after all,
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another "hearer". This is particularly true where
the investigator participates in the interactions
herself, as was the case in the present study.
(Where the child1s utterance is addressed to someone
other than the investigator, the latter1s knowledge
of the contextual information shared by speaker and
hearer will naturally be more limited.)
3.5 PRAGMATICS AND THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE
DEVELOPMENT
McShane (1980) prefers Grice1s account of meaning in
'his investigation of language development but the
predominant influence in most such studies is that
of Speech Act Theory. Various investigators who
have based their analysis of the development of
communication of Speech Act Theory include Dore
(1975) and Bates, Camaioni and Volterra (1975), as
well as Bruner, whose work was cited above.
Dore (1975) adopts the speech act as the basic unit
of linguistic communication in an attempt to resolve
what he refers to as "the holophrase controversy".
In the course of this analysis, three "language uni-
versals" are proposed: communicative functions,
referring expressions and predicating expressions.
Dore distinguishes nine types of "primitive speech
act": labelling, repeating, answering, requesting
(action), requesting (answer), calling, greeting,
protesting and practising.
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However Dore has been criticised (Griffiths 1979)
for failing to distinguish between utterances which
are communicative (i.e. where the young child
intends to communicate something to an addressee)
and utterances which are simply informative to the
adult hearer. This distinction is made by Lyons
(1977 cited in Griffiths 1979) and taken up by
Griffiths (1979) to point out the difference between
the acts of "labelling" and "practising", and those
acts which he sees as truly communicative. It is
essential to bear this distinction in mind in the
attempt to identify verbal strategies for gathering
information about language, as such strategies nece-
ssarily use language in its communicative function.
(It should be noted that "labelling" in this context
appears to be used in a particularly limited sense,
since many acts of labelling are clearly communica-
tive. )
It soon becomes clear that "the application of
speech-act theory to language development is not an
entirely straightforward affair" (McShane 1980) :
25). McShane's own work draws on various different
approaches, including Searle's speech act theory,
Grice's account of utterer's meaning and Halliday's
theory of language development.
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McShane (1980) and Ha11iday (1975) are both concer-
ned with describing and discussing developmental
changes in language over months or years and their
categories span the entire range of the child's
utterances at various stages of early language
development. The aim of the present study, on the
other hand, was to investigate a possible mechanism
or tool for developmental change, by observing it in
operation over a relatively short period, that is at
a particular time in the course of language develop-
ment. Nevertheless, while McShane and Ha11iday's
aims are different from that of the present study,
all three studies represent an attempt to categorize
children's utterances according to various func-
tions. For this reason it is useful to look
briefly at the systems of categorization used by
these two authors.
Hal1iday (1975) proposes a framework for a func-
tional or sociolinguistic account of early first
language development. This account is based on
recorded observations of Ha11iday's son, Nige1, and
it includes a description of three phases.
Phase I: the child's initial functional-
linguistic system
Phase II: the transition from this system
to that of adult language
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Phase Ill: the learning of the adult
language
In Phase I Halliday identifies six functions to be
used in the analysis of early language:
Functions Meaning Glosses
(Halliday 1975) (Wells 1981)
1. Instrumental "I want"
2. Regulatory "Do as I tell you"
3. Interactional "Me and you"
4. Personal "Here I come"
5. Heuristic "Tell me why"
6. Imaginative "Let • s pretend"
A later (developmentally) addition is the
Informative function ("I've got something to tell
you") •
out of these develop two broad functional categories
or "macro-functions", referred to by Halliday as
"pragmatic" and "mathetic". The pragm~tic function
derives mainly from the instrumental and regulatory
systems of Phase I, and the mathetic from the inter-
actional, personal and heuristic functions of that
phase. Halliday suggests that the non-pragmatic
utterances constitute a mathetic function, as they
enable the child to learn about his environment
(both social and material aspects). This type of
language is seen as aiding the child in his const-
ruction of reality. Initially any utterance is
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either pragmatic or mathetic, and certainly in
Nigel's case, 75 per cent of the new lexical items
entering his system (NL 6-7 i.e. 18-19.5 months,
Halliday 1975 : 75) enter in the context of the
mathetic, rather than the pragmatic function. The
primary criterion used by Halliday to distinguish
these functions was whether or not Nigel appeared to
expect a response. If he was only satisfied once a
response had been given, Halliday interpreted the
child's utterance as pragmatic. In practice it was
found that for a period of some months the distinc-
tion could be made on the basis of rising
(pragmatic) or falling (mathetic) utterance tone.
(Halliday's use of the term "pragmatic" is obviously
much more specific than that discussed in 3.2
above. )
Clearly this type of analysis or categorization of
early language will vary according to the different
emphases and presuppositions of different investiga-
tors. McShane (1980) outlines a detailed categori-
zation system for the analysis of data collected in
a longitudinal study of the language development of
six children during their second year. This system
(see Appendix A) has much in common with Halliday's,
but also differs from it in many important respects.
In fact McShane (1980) raises some serious
criticisms of Halliday's account of the development
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of language in general, and of his theory of the
transition from Phase I to Phase 11 in particular.
According to McShane, Ha11iday's discussion of the
"mathetic" function shows a lack of appreciation of
the need to understand the child's grasp of the
conceptual relationship between names and objects.
For, while Ha11iday sees naming (the first aspect of
the mathetic function) as the use of language to
learn about the environment, he fails to clarify
what the child is learning in this way.
While the concept of a mathetic function may appear
to have relevance for the investigation of verbal
strategies for gathering information about language,
these strategies are unlikely to fall neatly on the
mathetic side of Ha11iday's mathetic/pragmatic
distinction. Ha11iday (1975) himself notes that
each of these functions underlies the other to some
extent and that as the child's language progresses




SEMANTIC AND CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In looking at what it is that the child learns about
the environment and about language through his use
of that language, one is faced with the issue of the
relationship between semantic and conceptual
development.
Although the present study was not situated in the
field of semantics (to the exclusion of syntax,
pragmatics and discourse), its focus was on the
child's use of language to enhance his knowledge of
meaning, and particularly of word meaning. In
working with young children, word meaning is largely
concerned with reference or naming. While inves-
tigators such as McShane are concerned mainly with
how the child comes to understand the concept that
names denote objects, the present study looks at the
question of how the child learns what class of
objects a name denotes (McShane 1980). Here the
fundamental issue is that of joint attention, the
development of which has been studied by Bruner
(1975) and Trevarthen (Trevarthen & Hub1ey 1978).
Trevarthen's concept of "secondary intersubject-
ivity" refers to the infant's development of the
ability to interact with another person in such a
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way that attention to an object is shared by both,
as is the knowledge of this shared attention.
Once the "object" of this shared attention is lin-
guisticthe child's concepts will change and develop
accordingly and the distinction between his "mental
encyclopedia" and his "mental lexicon" (i.e. between
his general knowledge about the world, and his know-
ledge about words) becomes relevant (Clark and Clark
1977) •
As suggested in Chapter Two, this relationship is by
no means an easy one to investigate or explain.
Such an explanation is not within the scope of the
present study, which takes as an operating principle
Wells' (1981) assumption of a systematic relation~
ship between the categories of thought and the cate-
gories of linguistic meaning. While adding certain
qualifications to this assumption (in acknowledging
that talking and thinking are related but different
activities), Wells nevertheless believes that:
••• despite their autonomy, the two abstract
systems are related in such a way that it is
a relatively straight-forward task for the
children [sic] to discover the relationship
and to use his nonlinguistic representation
as a basis his mastery of the system of
linguistic representation.
(Wells 1981 : 79)
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4.2 ABSTRACTION THEORY
Various theories have been put forward to account
for concept formation and language learning - for
example abstraction theory, which may be seen as the
traditional psychological theory of concept forma-
tion, and which is based on the abstraction of com-
mon elements, or attributes. If the principles of
abstraction theory were extended to include the
notion of the child as an active hypothesis-tester
(producing a word and awaiting confirmation or
correction), the theory would fit in well with
Brown's (1958) account of the Original Word Game
(Nelson 1974). Two of the most serious criticisms
raised' against this theory are that it does not in
fact account for the selection and generation of
concepts by the child and that the abstraction
process proposed by the theory appears unwieldy for
the purposes of the young child. After all, a vast
number of concepts are acquired in early childhood,
and the process by which this is accomplished must
therefore be quick and remarkably efficient.
As far as the early development of meanings of
lexical items is concerned, three Ilreasonably
coherent positions ll are: the semantic feature
hypothesis, the functional core hypothesis and the
prototype hypothesis (Atkinson 1982).
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4.3 THE SEMANTIC FEATURE HYPOTHESIS
This position is associated mainly with the work of
E.E. Clark and is based on the central assumption
that the meaning of a word may be specified in terms
of a set of features. Other assumptions are as
follows:
(i) A child's understanding of the meaning of
a word need not be based on the same set
of features as the mature speakerJs under-
standing of that word.
(ii) On first hearing a certain word, the child
will sample from a particular set of
features. This accounts for the mismatch
between his understanding of the word and
that of the adult.
(iii) The basis of this sampled subset of features
is perceptual (rather than conceptual or
functional).
(iv) Gradually the child learns new words, as
well as features by which these may be dis-
tinguished from words with which he is
already familiar. In this way the child's
understanding of word meanings will eventu-




(v) The order of acquisition of features of
meaning is from general to specific.
(Summarized from Atkinson 1982)
Central to this approach is the phenomenon of over-
extension. This is the phenomenon where the
child's meaning overlaps with that of the adult, but
extends further, for example the use of the word
"bow-wow" to refer to horses and cows as well as to
dogs (Clark and Clark 1977). The complementary
phenomenon of underextension should also be noted,
although this is much harder to identify in prac-
tice. The standard example used to illustrate this
phenomenon comes from Bloom's (1973) description of
how Allison, at the age of nine months, used the
word "car" to refer to cars moving along the street
below her window, but not for stationary cars, cars
in pictures or cars in which she was travelling.
Clark and Clark (1971) suggest that in both cases
(over and underextension) children have to adjust
these initial word meanings until a match with adult
usage is achieved. The phenomenon of overextension
in particular is an important one to bear in mind
when interpreting the utterances of young children
in terms of strategies for gathering information
about language. One must be careful, for example,
not to confuse such overextensions with the type of
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violations of semantic categories described by
Horgan (198l).
As far as the semantic feature hypothesis as a whole
is concerned, it has been criticized on the grounds
that it cannot be related to a general theory of
semantic structure, nor to an independent theory of
perceptual development (Atkinson 1982). This, it
is suggested, is because the features considered by
the theory are "blatantly ad hoc", given the one
criterion that they are perceptual.
Nelson's (1974) objection to the semantic feature
theory is that it is unable to account for concep-
tual meaning independent of lexical items and is not
supported by evidence from her own longitudinal
study (Nelson 1973) and that of Bloom (1973).
Elliot (198l) points out that children commonly
appear to base their use of language on categories
outside the normal scope of adult categorization and
she cites the example of a child who extended his
word for railway engines to include anything which
hissed, smoked or made some similar noise. In
general Elliot cautions against the assumption that
the child's naming of objects provides a direct
indication of how he understands the meanings of the
words used. She suggests that, although the
objects for which a child uses a word may have
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certain perceptual properties in common, this does
not necessarily mean that his underlying concept is
nothing but a group of perceptually based features.
4.4 THE FUNCTIONAL CORE HYPOTHESIS
Nelson (1974) suggests that psychologists have ten-
ded to neglect the distinction between the processes
of concept generation and concept identification.
This has meant that identifying attributes are seen
as a concept's basic 'components and the means by
which a new concept is derived and situated within a
hierarchical classification of other concepts.
Disagreeing with this, Nelson draws on Piaget's
principle of similarity through action (in sensori-
motor schemes) and Cassirer's (1953) proposal that
the essence of a concept is not substance, but
function (Cassirer's relational theory of concepts).
In constructing her own functional core hypothesis,
Nelson (1974) contends that the process of feature
representation described by abstraction theory and
semantic feature theory is in fact secondary to the
more basic cognitive operation of the scheme and the
functional concept.
The functional core hypothesis attempts to account
for:
(i) Those commonalities among sets of lexical
items which are revealed by examining the
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vocabularies of a large number of young
children.
(ii) The fact that young children are quick to
invent a word if no known linguistic
expression is appropriate.
(iii) The fact that, after words are acquired,
they become generalized in their appli-
cation. Overextension would be a
particular example of this phenomenon.
(Summarized from Atkinson 1982)
Atkinson's evaluation of the functional core hypo-
thesis is fairly damning, his principal criticisms
being that Nelson fails to discuss the functional
core concept in adequate depth, and that the theory
is "dangerously unconstrained" at the point of first
word acquisition.
It does seem that the main implication of Nelson's
view for the present study is simply to add simi-
larity on the basis of function, action or affect,
to Clark's notion of similarity on the basis of
simple perceptual properties (notably that of
shape). As Atkinson's criticism suggests, it is not
easy to substantiate the claim that functional
similarities are primary, or more basic than percep-
tual similarities.
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One other important point arising out of Nelson's
approach is her warning that the distinction between
knowledge about objects and word meaning takes time
to develop (Nelson 1978).
4.5 THE PROTOTYPE HYPOTHESIS
The central assumption of the last two approaches is
that word meaning can be seen in tenns of a set of
features. This idea has been criticized and in the
work on adult cognition it was suggested that seman-
tic categories operate in terms of degrees of
membership, rather than a specific set of critical
features (Atkinson 1982).
This criticism fonns the basis of what Atkinson
calls the prototype hypothesis and the main idea
behind it is that semantic categories are internally
structured and that some instances will constitute
"better" members of a particular category than
others. One model of adult semantic memory which
adheres to this notion is the feature comparison
model (Smith, Shoben and Rips 1974). 'According to
this model a robin would be seen as a prototypical
bird, whereas a chicken would not. These authors
make a distinction between the "defining features"
of a concept and its "accidential" features. Such
features as having wings and a red breast would be
defining features of the concept of robin, while
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features such as eating bread and being undomesti-
cated would not be. No features are critical in
the sense that, for example, a robin whose breast
feathers turned brown could no longer be called a
robin.
This distinction between defining and accidental
features is a very helpful one for an understanding
of how young children come to know the meanings of
words. In terms of the present study, this dis-
tinction implies that the child's hypothesis-testing
will be directed largely at differentiating defining
from accidental features.
With regard to the developmental work based on the
prototype hypothesis, Atkinson's (1982) main reser-
vation is based on the lack of any clear specifica-
tion of the precise nature of prototypes. Never-
theless, it seems likely that this approach comes
nearer to accommodating the complexity of semantic
development than the others discussed here.
In the'discussion in Part 11, reference is made to
the prototype hypothesis as outlined by investi-
gators of adult cognition, since the various
applications of this hypothesis to the study of
child development do not have direct relevance for
the present study.
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PART 11 : THE STUDY
CHAPTER ONE
FRAMEWORK AND METHOD
1.1 A FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING THE CHILD'S USE OF
LANGUAGE TO LEARN MORE ABOUT LANGUAGE
The preceding review serves not only to outline the
work in language development which is relevant to
the present study, but also to provide a theoretical
framework within which to pose the problem investi-
gated by this study, and from which to draw guide-
lines for the interpretation and analysis of the
data. Before describing the study itself, some of
the main points from this review will be drawn
together to indicate the framework within which the
study was conducted.
·1.1.1 THE CHILD AS AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT IN
LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT
The child is seen as an active participant in his
own language development. Piaget's account of the
child as learning by acting on and manipulating his
environment is a useful theoretical starting point.
Although Piaget does not deal with the topic of the
present study, his account of the development of
sensorimotor thought illustrates the principle of
learning by interacting with and manipulating the
environment. It therefore provides a useful base
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for the suggestion that the young child manipulates
his verbal environment to learn more about language.
It is by acting on language that he develops his
knowledge of language. A consideration of the cog-
nitive prerequisites for language helps to broaden
this theoretical base.
However it is also important to take into account
individual differences and the communicative context
of language development - two issues which would be
neglected in relying too heavily on the Genevan
tradition. Also important in a theory of the child
as an active language learner, is the representation
of purposes {or intentions}, plans and information,
in terms of long-term and working memory.
1.1.2 HYPOTHESIS
It is suggested that one aspect of the child1s
active participation in his language development
involves his use of language to learn more about
language. The main hypothesis of this study was
that the child formulates hypotheses about language
{and about the meanings of words in particular} and
tests these hypotheses by"manipulating his verbal
environment according to various strategies. These
strategies are referred to as verbal information-
gathering strategies.
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1.1.3 CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING THIS ACTIVITY
There is, of course, no direct access to such hypo-
theses or strategies and the absence of any clear
meta1inguistic awareness at the age of two to three
years makes them even more difficult to identify
than adult hypotheses and strategies. However some
guidelines for inferring their existence may be
derived from the philosophy of language and the
psychology of language development.
The first requirement of the present study was to be
able to recognize when a child is seeking feedback
about his understanding of language. Whether this
activity is said to be intentional or purposeful,
the important point for this study was to be able to
identify it when it did occur. This was done
primarily on the basis of the notions of directed-
ness (Sear1e 1983) or "sustained direction of beha-
viour during deployment of means" (Bruner, in
Greenfie1d 1980), and the notion of the presentation
or representation of conditions of satisfaction
(Sear1e), or "stop order defined by an end state"
(Bruner).
Several of the analytic principles for this study
were derived from Greenfie1d's (1980) attempt to
provide an operational and logical analysis of
intentionality by examining the use of discourse in
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early child language. She believes that it is
possible to operationa1ize intention through an
analysis of the sequential aspect of interaction
behaviour, and of conversational discourse in par-
ticu1ar. Several points from Greenfie1d's (1980)
discussion are outlined below:,
The negotiated interpretation of intention
is central to an interactiona1 approach to
intention.
Most studies have neglected the infant's
interpretations of the adult's intentions
(in terms of action and visual behaviour).
"The processes of mutual interpretation that
go on .in communicative interaction, as mani-
fest through microana1ytic techniques, can,
however, reveal observable signs of the two
major features of intentionality direction-
a1ity and terminal requirements (Bruner 1974)
and go beyond the solipcism ofdeach partici-
pant's interpretation of the other partici-
pant's intention."
(Greenfie1d 1980 : 259)
In order to establish a direction there must be
two ordered points.
Directiona1ity is only indicated where there is
not immediate acknowledgement. It is pre-
cise1y when the intended consequences are not
immediately forthcoming that the intentional
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structure becomes most accessible to the
investigator.
The adult's collaboration with the child's
intended plan provides behavioural evidence for
the adult's perception of the child's
intention.
If one participant is happy to continue the
interaction on the basis of the other's inter-
pretation of his .intention, this still does not
give one direct access to the original
intention. Nevertheless Greenfield argues
that "the agreed upon interpretation of each
person's intention in the dyad is an important
phenomenon in its own right." (Greenfield
1980 : 262)
Without complementary intentions between the
parties, the communication will be
unsuccessful.
The intention to communicate (the intention to
affect the hearer/s) should be distinguished
from a communicative intention (the particular
effect intended).
In discussing requests, Griffiths (1979) suggests
that one can recognize the goal as having been
achieved when the child quiets or adopts a different
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mode or direction of behaviour. One would also be
looking for evidence of mutual awareness or under-
standing of the child's utterance/s on the part of
the child (the speaker) and the hearer, in terms of
Grice's notion of meaning-nn. As the above
discussion of Greenfie1d's (1980) ideas makes clear,
this is complementary to rather than distinct from
evidence of directedness and presentation or repre-
sentation of conditions of satisfaction. For exam-
ple, Greenfie1d suggests that directiona1ity is only
indicated where there is not immediate acknowledge-
ment, which could be seen as the point where mutual
awareness breaks down and has to be re-established.
The point of including Grice's notion of mutual
awareness or mutual understanding as a consideration
in its own right, is to emphasize its value in
recognizing when a child is actively seeking feed-
back about language. For quite apart from evidence
of directedness and conditions of satisfaction on
the part of the child, the way in which a child's
utterance is understood and responded to by the
adult provides an extremely important guideline for
the investigator who is also concerned with the
interpretation of that utterance. The usefulness
of this aid to interpretation will be appreciated if
one considers all the contextual information that
is likely to be readily available to the person
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addressed, but which is extremely difficult to
record for the purposes of later interpretation.
This is true whether the person interacting with the
child is familiar with him or not, but will
obviously be especially true if that person is one
of the child's caretakers or siblings.
The basis of identifying the activity of seeking
information about language was therefore the inter-
pretation of a child's utterances in terms of
directedness, the conditions of satisfaction and
mutual understanding between speaker and hearer.
The second requirement of the study was to be able
to infer that this activity took place in terms of
certain identifiable strategies. The idea that
children use verbal information-gathering strategies
implies that the utterances involved in seeking
information about language will display some form of
regularity, or will give rise to patterns of inter-
action in which certain regularities can be
detected. In order to identify such strategies,
sequences of interactions would have to be scanned
and comparisons made amongst those utterances which
may be interpreted as involving the eliciting of
feedback about language.
If children do use various verbal information-
gathering strategies, each type of strategy should
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have its own typical features which are evident in
the pattern of the interactions associated with its
•
use. This should be so particularly when a child
is interacting with a caretaker, as it is assumed
that such strategies do not arise simply out of the
child's own cognitive development. Although the
focus of this study was on the active role of the
child, it was important to remember that it was on
the role of the child in the "language-transmission
partnership", and the analysis was based on the
interaction between the child and a more mature
speaker.
Verbal information-gathering strategies are seen as
arising out of the communicative interaction develo-
ping between the child and her caretaker/so It may
well be that a child's choice of strategy can be
traced directly back to some distinctive pattern in
her parents' way of communicating. This was no
doubt the case with Kelly, as Horgan (198l) points
out that she was exposed to language games from an
early age. Kelly's linguistic "jokes", such as her
violations of semantic categories, are quite likely
to have developed because she learnt that this type
of interaction was appreciated by her parents, and
that she was therefore able to attract and hold
their attention in this way. However this does not
mean that such a pattern of interaction could not
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develop into an independent strategy with the test-
ing of hypotheses or gathering of linguistic
information as its primary purpose.
Griffiths (1979 : 117) suggests that children at the
holophrase stage use language to draw others' atten-
tion to objects simply in order to "have the
pleasure of dialogue". However, he also argues
that in using language in this way, the child is
learning to refer to the objects, thus developing a
means for referring to absent entities. Once the
child is past the holophrase stage it does seem
unlikely that his sole purpose in referring to
objects or events will be "pleasure of dialogue".
The present study is not restricted to child/
caretaker interaction, as it is assumed that such
strategies, once developed, will operate in inter-
action with any competent speaker. In fact it may
well be easier to identify an instance of
hypothesis-testing if the hearer of the initiating
utterance does not fall automatically into the pat-
tern of interaction which typifies the use of a
particular strategy. Evidence of directedness and
the conditions of satisfaction would be clearer
without the immediate understanding and feedback
which a caretaker, familiar with that type of ini-
tiating utterance, would be likely to provide.
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1.1.4 CONTEXT
The context of this study is a broadly conver-
sational one, as recommended by Dore (1979 : 337),
who sees conversation as the "immediate and primary
context for acquisition", lithe most significant
environment for learning language", and by
Greenfield (1980) whose attempt to operationalize
intention depends on the analysis of conversational
discourse.
1.2 METHOD
1.2.1 COLLECTION OF THE DATA
The study took place in two homes, and encompassed
the observation of three children in interaction
with various others - primarily the mother, the
investigator and siblings, for a period of six to
eight weeks. In the first home two male siblings
were· observed in interaction with their mother and
the investigator, and occasionally the maid. N.
was two years and Ma. three years and three months
at the start of the study. In the second home, P.,
a male child aged three years and ten months at the
start of the study, was observed in interaction with
his mother, father and elder brother, the investiga-
tor, and occasionally various visitors.
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These subjects were chosen from a group of four
families recruited through acquaintances of the
investigator. There was no formal criterion for
the selection, although an informal assessment of
language production was used as a very rough guide-
line. Being slow to talk means very little as a
predictor of later linguistic ability, or even as an
\
indicator of current comprehension ability. Never-
theless, it seems fair to assume that those children
whose production of language is relatively advanced
for their age will be the most likely to be using
effective verbal information-gathering strategies.
Two families were not included in the study for the
reasons outlined below:
Family 3: a single female child (aged 2 years at
the start of the study) was observed in interaction
with her mother and the investigator. Although she
was observed for several sessions in the expectation
that her level of production would reach an adequate
point, this was not the case by the fourth session,
and it was decided to exclude the child from the
study. The fact that she was only separated from
her "dummy" at great emotional cost was also a draw-
back to an accurate understanding of her utterances!
Family 4: a fourth mother/child dyad participated
in the study for a full six week period, but the
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data from these observations has not been included
in the analysis and discussion for two reasons.
Most importantly, the child was very soft-spoken
and although many of her utterances could be trans-
cribed accurately, it was felt that there was a bias
in favour of those utterances which imitated or
relied heavily on what had been said before, as well
as those utterances which were taken up and expanded
by an adult. There were many sequences where the
child's utterances could not be transcribed accura-
tely, or even at all, and it was felt that trans-
cription was too context-dependent to be a .reliable
source of the type of data required for this study.
Secondly, the child's behaviour was clearly influen-
ced by the investigator's presence, in that she
often became very excited, so that her speech
pattern was quite different from those times when
she appeared calmer and less affected by the novelty
of the investigator's visits. This was confirmed
by recordings made by the mother when she was alone
with the child. This situation did improve over
the weeks, but ,the effect was still quite noticeable
during the last sessions. Quite apart from the
concern that the samples of speech collected were
not typical of the majority of the child's inter-
actions with familiar adults, it was also a problem
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in that her speech became far less coherent and
audible when she was excited.
The remaining two family groups were observed in
their homes at approximately one-weekly intervals,
for a period of six to eight weeks. Each session
lasted approximately one and a half hours for N. and
Ma. and they were observed for a total of eight ses-
sions (Family 1). In piS case (Family 2) there
were six sessions lasting approximately one hour
each. In this way it was hoped to monitor roughly
equal periods of interaction involving each child.
After a preliminary visit, each session was recorded
using a Philips portable cassette auditory tape
recorder, carried slung over the investigator's
shoulder •. A detachable microphone was clipped to
the strap of the recorder. No notes were taken
during the observation periods, as the investigator
participated in any ongoing activities and inter-
actions. Any necessary notes were written after
each session. No attempt was made to structure the
situation as the desired context for observation was
a fairly broad scope of normal everyday activities
such as play, "reading", "helping" in the house and
garden and commenting on topics of mutual interest
(e.g. animals, food etc.).
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The tape recordings were transcribed in full by the
investigator and, together with the contextual
notes, constituted the raw data for analysis.
1.2.2 ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
The analysis was performed in two stages:
(i) Each of the two sets of data was examined as
a whole and several verbal information-
gathering strategies were identified for
each child. This was done on the basis of
the emergence of consistent patterns or
-
regularities in the data, where an initiating
utterance from the child gave rise to a
typical pattern of interaction between himself
and his hearer, such that informative feedback
about language was provided by the hearer.
A useful starting point for this analysis was
provided by those phenomena which are well
established within the study of language
development, such as questioning (by means of
interrogative utterances), imitation and
naming or stating.
(ii) Once these strategies were identified for each
child, the data was coded in terms of indivi-
dual instances of each strategy. Also inclu-
ded in this coding procedure was a separate
category for those words which appeared
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regularly throughout the record of a child's
utterances, in the various contexts where
verbal information-gathering or hypothesis
testing could be inferred, even in the absence
of a clear instance of one of the identified
strategies. Part of the basis for inferring
that a child was testing his understanding of
a certain word was an overall consideration of
the use of that word throughout the study.
The raw data were examined by one of the investiga-
tor's colleagues who was familiar with the study of
language development and the identified verbal
information-gathering strategies were discussed.
The data were then coded IIblind ll by the colleague.
Once the second coding was complete the two sets of
analyz~d data were compared and discussed and a
final agreement was reached on the utterance sequ-
ences to be included as examples of the strategies.
Agreement was also reached on the individual words '





In view of the interpretative nature of the
analysis, the discussion of results will be inte-
grated with their detailed presentation. A brief
summary of the results is presented below.
2.1 SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS
2.1.1 VERBAL INFORMATION-GATHERING STRATEGIES
Four strategies were identified as common to all
three children:
(i) Asking direct questions about names or
meanings.
(ii) Naming or stating.
(iii) Metaphoric use of language.
(iv) Selective imitation.
In addition, various individual strategies were
identified.
N. and MA.





(i) Taking up words and using them in the same
context, but not as repetition of an adult's
utterance.
(ii) Taking up words and applying them to
different topics or in different contexts.
The number of (child) utterances involved in the use
of verbal information-gathering strategies was
calculated as a percentage of a child's total number
of utterances. This included not only the child's
initial utterance/s giving rise to the exchange, but
also the other utterances made by him during the
rest of· that interactional sequence (i.e. until the
conditions of satisfaction were met or the topic
changed) • For example:






This is wood like
that train you
gave me.
I. Oh yes, so it is.
Total for P. = 5 utterances to be included in the
total of naming/stating utterances.
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STRATEGY ]L. Ma. R·
Direct questions 0,75 2,17 4,26
Naming/stating 7,95 6,36 7,61
Metaphoric use of language 4,14 1,93 1,13
Selective imitation 2,39 0,67 1,51
Que.stions not directly related
to word names or meanings 2,49 1,3
Arguing/denial 1,6 0,59
Taking up words in same sense
or context 5,02
Taking up words in different
sense or context 1,67
Table 1: Percentage of utterances devoted to
particular verbal information-gathering
strategies, expressed in terms of the
total number of utterances per child.
It shou1d·be noted that the above summary table is
not intended to imply that, for example, Ma. would
never take up a word and re-introduce it into the
conversation as in the last two sections of this
table. It simply means that he did not do so in a
strategic way, that is, he did not use these two
verbal information-gathering strategies.
Similarly, only a few of the children's naming or
stating utterances were included as instances of the
use of what has been termed the naming/stating
strategy for gathering information about language.
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2.1.2 INDIVIDUAL WORDS TESTED BY N. AND MA.
N.
might
little tiny (big, small)
metal, glass, clay
mouse
my, my mummy's, your
brand new, new
other, another





No such words were identified for P.
2.1.3 INTERSUBJECTIVE AGREEMENT
A measure of intersubjective agreement was calcula-
ted according to the number of utterances which were
included in the investigator's initial analysis of






Table 2: Percentage of initially selected
utterances retained after final analysis
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2.2 DISCUSSION
Discussion of the results of analysis will be
supported by relevant examples presented in the
text. In one or two instances, where the relevant
interaction sequences are particu~arly lengthy,
these are set out in full in Appendix B. It is
neither practical nor necessary to include all
instances in discussing a particular strategy.
(This information is represented in the summary of
results.)
2.2.1 PRESENTATION OF EXAMPLES
Examples are presented in ordinary English ortho-
graphy, deviating from this only in the case of
marked mispronunciation. Question and exclamation
marks and dashes provide some minimal indication
of intonation and pauses. The child's utterances
are set out against the left-hand margin of the page
and each utterance begins on a new line. All other
utterances are set out continuously in the middle
column, with any necessary contextual information
appearing inside square brackets against the right-




H. - P.'s brother
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2.2.2 STRATEGIES COMMON TO ALL THREE CHILDREN
(i) ASKING DIRECT QUESTIONS ABOUT NAMES OR
MEANINGS
The use of interrogative utterances such as, "what's
that?", "what's that called?", "what is this?", or
"what's X?", is perhaps the most obvious way in
which a child might use language to increase his
understanding of names and word meanings. Cer-
tainly it is the most usual way for an adult to do
so, whether she asks someone else or "asks" a dic-
tionary. However the data from the present study
suggest that there are various factors which deter-
mine the extent to which a child will rely on this
as a verbal information-gathering strategy.
A relatively high percentage of P.'s utterances (see
Table 1) were involved in conversational exchanges
initiated by interrogative utterances of this type,
for example:





M. It's an apple
corer and it's
to take the pips
out of the middle
of the apple.
Look, I'll show
you on this one,
shall I show you?
M. It makes a hole
right through the
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There 'you are, now
it's got the pips
and things out,
and that bit in
middle is called
the core.
M. Mm. It's a bit.hard
and we don't eat it.
I'm having trouble
with this apple
corer, I can never
get the thing out.
There we are •
M. Mustard - is a
fairly burny mix-
ture that we eat
with meat sometimes.
This is mustard.








It's a piece of
round nothing.
M. A piece of round
nothing.
M. Well what is it?
M. Is a hole
something?






Note that the interaction here is between P. and
his mother and that the "what is x" interrogative
utterance type appears to be understood by the two
of them as a request for a full explanation. P. 's
mother is probably particularly likely to give de-
tailed explanations of word meanings in view of both
parents' concern over the correct use of language
(see p. 146 for discussion of this point). The
development and use of this strategy is therefore
likely to have been encouraged by P.'s parents.
The following is another example showing just how





M. What made you
burp?
P. A bup, bip.
M. What's that?






M. Well, there are
several things
called bulbs -





a bulb, and it's













Nelson (1973) notes that questioning at the age of
two years was positively related to the indices of
language development used in her study. In parti-
cular, she found a positive relationship between
questioning and vocabulary acquisition. However
she cautions that this need not imply that question-
ing is "an efficient strategy for acquiring a larger
lexicon" (1973 : 54), since it could simply be that
advanced speakers engage in questioning more often
than other children. The latter interpretation
fits in with the idea that the mastery of questions
is a complex achievement for the young language
learner.
It is in considering what Nelson (1973) refers to as
"language questions" that one is most clearly con-
fronted with the problem of distinguishing semantic
and conceptual knowledge, or knowledge about lan-
guage and knowledge about the world.
The problem of the relationship between language and
thought is an enormously complex one which is well
beyond the scope of this study.
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Nevertheless the
basic position taken here can be outlined briefly as
follows: the Piagetian notion that the roots of
both language and thought lie in early sensorimotor
action is preferred to Vygotsky1s view that each has
different roots. However language is seen as more
integral to thought than is implied by piaget1s des-
cription of it as a tool for thought.
In the context of the present study a child1s utter-
ance "What1s that?1I may be positioned somewhere on a
continuum between a request for information about
objects or events and a r,equest for information
about words. Where the utterance is said to fall
on this continuum will depend on its context, in
particular the way in which the criteria (directed-
ness etc.) are fulfilled.
In this way, some interrogative utterances which
might in isolation appear to relate to IIlanguage
questions ll were excluded from this category, for
example:
Ma. Why1s she,
Why I s she got
some cake, or
some apple -
Is it apple tart?
M. No, it1s jam
doughnut.
Ma. I want some.
Given the overall context of the interrogative
utterance, Ills it appletart?lI, the most reasonable
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inference is that Ma. knows the meaning of lI appl e
tart ll and is simply seeking empirical confirmation
that this is what "shell (the investigator) has.
On being told, liNo, it's jam doughnut ll , he does not
seek elaboration on the meanings of these two terms.
This may be compared with the following example,
where the intention is clearly to elicit information
about the correct use of terms:
Ma. Is that a bike,
or is this a
bike?









do yours as, as a
a scooter.
Here M.'s understanding of Ma.'s intention and Ma.'s
own acceptance of the response based on this inter-
pretation, support the inference of the activity of
verbal information-gathering.
Some interrogative utterances may superficially
appear to be IIpurely empirical ll , but taken in con-






I. It's one like H.'s.
A tape recorder.
You said you'd




While this at first appeared to be a question equi-
valent to: "ls that a tape recorder like my
brother's?", it became clear across sessions that
this child was not yet able to apply the name
"tape recorder" spontaneously, nor was he fully
aware of its defining features. This example
illustrates the usefulness of analysis in the con-
versational context and across sessions.
The following example illustrates very clearly the
difficulty of categorizing such questions:
Ma. Mum, isn't
this a lily?
M. Oh, it looks
just like a
a lilypad.













(Note: * indicates word/s which could not be
transcribed.)
In such instances, as indeed in all linguistic ana-
lysis, the value of intersubjective agreement cannot
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be over-emphasized. As mature and competent spea-
kers of the language themselves, it is assumed that
both the investigator and her colleague had avail-
able to them in the interpretation of utterances,
many cues which would be extremely difficult to
formalize •.
It was suggested at the beginning of this section
that various factors may determine the extent to
which this type of interrogative utterance is used
to pose questions directly related to names or word
meanings. It was further noted that P. was found
to use this verbal information-gathering strategy on
a regular basis and to considerable effect. Of
course the nature of the data presented in this
study precludes any conclusions about how important
this strategy is for children in general. Never-
theless, what was noted was that N. and Ma. did not
appear to rely on it to the extent to which P. was
observed to do (N. = 0,75%, Ma. = 2,17%, see Table
1) •
As far as N. is concerned, the tendency not to use
this strategy may be explained by considering the
complexities involved in the mastery of interroga-
tive utterances. WH-words are at first "where" and
"what ", although only "where" appears to be
correctly understood (Klima and Bellugi 1966) and
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confusion between what, where, when and why ques-
tions persists for some time (Ervin-Tripp 1970).
Since N. was the youngest subject by one year and
three months, he may well simply not have mastered
the use of this type of interrogative utterance
sufficiently for it to operate as a reliable means
of gathering information about meaning.
However, one might speculate that some children
would find this particular verbal information-
gathering strategy an efficient one only if used
fairly infrequently. For if young children, learn-
ing a language for the first time, relied heavily
on interrogative utterances to increase their know-
ledge of language, their conversations would consist
of a constant stream of questions and answers.
This would probably prove an inefficient way of
learning boundaries of word meanings for two rea-
sons. Firstly, the question-answer format is a
very well defined pattern of interaction in adult
communication, where the conditions of satisfaction
for questions about language are often quite mini-
mal, for example:
What's this flower called?
It's a gardenia.
Although adults often do give more detailed answers
to such questions from young children, the
conventional (adult) illocutionary force could
III .
influence the adult hearer, resulting in a response





M. It's a rnasher.
It's for mash-
ing potatoes.
This response, while more than likely to satisfy an
adult questioner, clearly does not provide the two-
year-old with sufficient information, as he goes on








you mash it with
that.
(See 2.2.3 (i) for a discussion of such questions
which are less directly concerned with names or
meanings.)
Similarly:
Ma. I thought it was
a elephant.
Ma. What is this -
this?
I. Let me have a
look. I think
it's a donkey.












Ma. Because I thought




I. Oh, and you mean










I thought it was.
I. Mm.




A second point about the inefficiency of using too
many interrogative utterances concerning meanings,
is that adults might well find such a pattern of
interaction boring or irritating. This could have
the effect of making their replies terse and minim-
ally informative.
In general, because question-asking by means of
interrogative utterances is such a well defined pat-
tern of interaction, usually with clear beginning
and end markers, conversational exchanges initiated
in this way may often be less well integrated into
the overall conversational context than interaction
sequences which are initiated in some other way.
Such better integrated sequences are more likely to
provide the young child with clues about the bounda-
ries of word meanings, as each piece of information
113
is likely to be more clearly embedded in its
context.
Whether or not this particular verbal information-
gathering is an efficient one for a child, will
depend very much on those with whom the child inter-
acts regularly. Whereas P.'s mother tends to res-
pond to this type of interrogative utterance in some
detail, this does not appear to be the case with N.
and Ma.'s mother. Since both mothers share the
same SES and culture, this difference supports
Robinson's (198l) suggestion that the connection
between SES and differences in question-answer pat-
terns is a complex one. Individual differences
within SES and culture must be taken into account.
Of course interrogative utterances concerning names
or meanings may be used simply to initiate an inte-
raction and direct the adult's attention to the
child's purpose. The important thing, after all,
is the adult's understanding of the child's purpose,
and this will come from the overall context of the
utterance. It is utterance meaning and not
sentence-type which will be most influential in
guiding the interaction.
Snyder-McLean and McLean (1978) place interrogative
utterances, or WH-questions, at the "most inten-
tional" end of their continuum of metalinguistic
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utterance types (see p. ll). They argue that there
are two ways in which WH-questions might function as
a G-strategy (verbal information-gathering
strategy). Firstly, such questions are likely to
elicit the linguistic (and particularly lexical)
information which the child is seeking. Secondly
they suggest that "question-asking simply increases
the probability that the mature listener will direct
an utterance to the child" (1978 : 31G). While this
is borne out to a certain extent in the results of
the present study, the previous discussion suggests
that interrogative utterances do not play the cen-
tral role implied by Snyder-McLean and McLean, in
the use of language to learn more about language.
In addition, their view of such interrogative utter-
ances as the most intentional type of G-strategy
needs to be examined. At first sight such utter-
ances may seem to be the easiest to interpret as
"intentional", since it is hard to imagine someone
asking a question without being aware that they want
an answer - or being aware of what type of response
would satisfy their purpose (even if this awareness
is in the form of intention-in-action). This is
probably what Snyder-McLean and McLean have in mind
when they refer to these utterances as "metalingui-
stic". However, as pointed out in Part I (Chapter
Two), the attribution of intentionality and of meta-
linguistic awareness is not as simple as it may at
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first appear. Certainly there is no reason to
suggest that the interrogative utterances described
in this section fulfill the criteria on which this
study is based any more conclusively than other
types of utterance. The Overall context of an
utterance, and not its sentence-type, is what is
important in interpreting its meaning.
Levinson (1983) refers to lIimperative ll , lIinter-
rogative ll and IIdeclarative ll as sentence-types.
These are linguistic categories that can be applied
to sentences, and must be distinguished from a
second set of categories, lIorder ll (or IIrequestll),
IIquestionll and "assertion" (or IIstatement ll ), which
are applicable to the use of sentences. In this
way, the child need not use the interrogative
sentence-type in order to ask a question. Rising
intonation often provides a way of identifying ques-
tions which do not follow the interrogative sentence
-type. However a more conclusive way of deciding
whether or not a child's utterance constitutes a
request for information, is according to the crite-
ria of directedness, conditions of satis-faction and
mutual understanding.
It is interesting to note that Meyer (1982), in
criticizing theorists who analyse sentences out of




He suggests that "reco
urse to language is a questioning process, to the
extent that in any discourse held, spoken or writ-
ten, there is a question at stake" (Meyer 1982 :
217) • He also regards linguistic activity as a
whole as simply one particular type of human action,
going on to suggest that human action itself should
be conceptualized as problem solving. These a s sum-
ptions are complementary to those on which the pre-
sent study is based.
(ii) NAMING/STATING
The second type of verbal information-gathering
strategy identified for all three children was that
of naming or stating. McShane (1980) describes
three "statement categories": naming, description
and information (see Appendix A). In studying
language development prior to the age of two years,
MCShane's concern with naming is primarily in terms
of how the child acquires the concept that names
denote objects. The focus of the present study, on
the other hand, was on how the child learns what
class of objects is denoted by a particular name,
which is only of secondary interest to McShane.
His distinction among naming, description and infor-
mation could be a useful starting point for an
analysis of this type of utterance. However, it
soon becomes clear that, as is so often the case
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with this type of analysis, a difference in focus
leads to a very different way of categorizing a
child's utterances.
In the present study, the strategy identified as
naming or stating cuts across several, if not all of
McShane's categories. McShane himself notes that
naming an object while pointing (viewed by him as an
instance of the Regulation category of Attention),
could also be categorized as Naming. Similarly the
Regulation category of Request refers to utterances
requesting or demanding something from another. It
will be argued here that many instances of naming or
stating are actually requests for confirmation or
further information.
There is of course a sense in which any utterance on
the part of a young child may elicit informative
feedback from an adult. The role played by adult
speech in facilitating language development has
received considerable attention in recent years (see
Wells and Robinson 1982 for a review of this work).
However a focus on the way adults elicit or respond
to a child's utterances is inadequate for the pur-
poses of the present study since the concept of a
strategy for language learning implies purpose on
the part of the child.
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For example, if the child were to say "There's an
elephant", it would be quite wrong to infer simply
on the basis of the adult's response: liNo, that's a
donkey", that the child was seeking confirmation or
correction. In such a case, the child's purpose
could be quite different, for example simply to gain
the adult's attention. This is of course true even
of interrogative utterances, but the problem is less
acute there.
For this reason it is essential to include other
criteria in evaluating the child's purpose.
Grice's concept of meaning-nn st~esses the impor-
tance of mutual awareness of the child's intention
and clearly one must look for evidence of this in
the child's utterances as well as those of the
adult. In terms of the previous discussion on
intentionality and awareness (see Part I, Chapter
Two), it is suggested that this mutual awareness
need not be of the type where speaker and hearer can
verbalize it. Certainly it will not be a mutual
metalinguistic awareness - "here we are talking
about language so that I can learn about 1anguage"l
One would not look for this level of awareness in a
question-answer exchange between an adult and a
young child, and yet it is clear that mutual aware-
ness exists there, or the communication would fail.
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It is therefore necessary to look for other indi-
cators of successful communication - in this case
the criteria of directedness and conditions of
satisfaction. These should help establish whether
the adult is providing informative or corrective
feedback purely through some motivation of her own,
or as an interactive response to some perceived
intention in the child's utterance, in which case
mutual understanding can be said to be operating.
In instances where feedback is immediate and con-
firming, it is difficult to establish directedness
and one can only get a limited idea of the condi-
tions of satisfaction:





















In this example the only hint of directedness lies
in the repetition of "little green man" (Greenfield
1980) • Since the child's attention quickly moves
elsewhere it seems that his purpose has been satis-
fied by his mother's response.
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However there is
not enough information to say whether he was satis-
fied by simply gaining her attention, or whether he
had in fact been seeking confirmation for his utter-
ance. The mother's report that he is in the pro-
cess of acquiring the concept of green does provide
some useful contextual information, but such a
sequence could only be reasonably classed an as ins-
tance of the naming/stating strategy if the child is
seen to use this strategy consistently elsewhere.
In some instances directedness is easier to estab-








N. Look, this little
tiny flower.




N. Ja. [Runs off]
Here the directedness is fairly clear. As far as
conditions of satisfaction are concerned, it could
be argued that the child's purpose is not met simply
by gaining the adult's attention ("Hm"), but only by
the adult's confirmation and expansion in "little
orange flower, jail. However the adult's first res-
ponse does appear somewhat noncommittal, and
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therefore possibly inadequate to satisfy any purpose
related to capturing her attention.
Nevertheless in this instance there is more evidence
for a naming or stating strategy in terms of direc-
tedness, the response chosen by the adult and the
fact that this response in some way satisfied the
child. There is no doubt that, if the child were
testing out the label "little tiny flower", such a
response would be appropriate to satisfying this
purpose. Further evidence for this sequence as an
instance of testing comes from the broader context
of the study as a whole, where the concept of size
(particularly expressed as "little tiny") was seen
to be a regular concern of this child. This last
point will be taken up again in discussing indivi-
dual words.
In some instances the child already has the adult's
full attention, which makes the inference of a
naming/stating strategy more reasonable, for
example:



















M. No, Mummy said
he could pick it
up, so he did,




pick it up, cause
it's heavy, and
it's slippery.




M. It's glass and next
time it might break
and then cut your
fingers.
N. Mm.
[The subsequent interaction is between Ma. and the
mother, with no attempt by N. to regain her
at;tention.]
However it should be noted that the criterion of
conditions of satisfaction can never really' be con-
elusive on its own. Even in the above example it
could be argued that the child's purpose was to keep
his .mother' s attention and sustain the ongoing
interaction. Nevertheless consideration of other
contextual evidence supports the inference of a
naming/stating strategy. For example, the adult's
response is particularly informative about the con-
cept of glass and there is general evidence of this
child's regular testing of the category boundaries
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of materials such as metal and glass. Taken to-
gether with the fact that he does not try to regain
his mother's attention (which he loses immediately
after this sequence), these considerations do sup-
port the hypothesis that a naming/stating strategy
is being used here.
The following example shows how the various criteria
may be reasonably satisfied:
I. On Wednesday he [Reading
ate through from a book,
one, two, three both looking
plums and he at a picture
was still of three
hungry. plums]
P. Ja.
I. On Thursday he
ate through -
P. Where's the [Looking at





















Here P.'s utterance, "there's another plum" is not
simply a repetition of the investigator's utterance,
since it is accompanied by pointing to a picture of
a plum.
Directedness is well established, particularly by
the prior question, "where's the other plum?" This
is a clear request for assistance in matching the
name to its pictorial representation. Greenfield's
criterion of at least two points is fulfilled:
"Where's the other plum? ••• "There's the other
plum" ••• "and there's a plum! ".
The conditions of satisfaction appear to be ful-
filxed by I.'s confirmation and elaboration of P.'s
statement, since this is followed by an assenting
utterance and a continuation of the interaction in
the slightly different direction initiated by her
pointing out a leaf. This is not to say that P. is
now completely satisfied that he fully understands
the use of the word "pl um". (That he does not is
clearly indicated by his later incorrect naming of a
strawberry as a plum.) The child should never be
viewed as engaging in exactly the same type of acti-
vity as an adult consulting a dictionary. In doing
so the adult is looking for a reasonably comprehen-
sive definition and guide to the use of a word.
The young child should rather be seen as working
gradually towards the meanings of words by slowly
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establishing the boundaries of their use. When the
adult consults a dictionary she already possesses a
large amount of semantic and conceptual knowledge
into which the dictionary definition can be assimi-
lated. This is clearly not the case with the young
child, whose testing of language is part of the pro-
cess of building up such a semantic and conceptual
network.
The notion of conditions of satisfaction refers to
the idea that one participant in a conversational
interaction accepts the other's response to his
utterance as indicative of successful communication.
In the child's case, even a minimal degree of con-
firmation, elaboration or correction of his utter-
ance may be acceptable. Viewing the child as
slowly establishing word meanings and category
boundaries, it may well be easier for him to assimi-
late small amounts of information about different
aspects of a word's meaning.
The notions of overextension and underextension are
,
obviously relevant here. In the case of the above
example, P., having shown himself capable of apply-
ing the name "plum" correctly in one instance, over-
extends the use of this word to include a picture of
a strawberry. Taken by itself, this example would
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appear to support Clark's semantic feature hypo-
thesis.
As far as mutual awareness is concerned, this is
partly established by P.'s apparent acceptance of
.I.'s response as discussed in relation to conditions
of satisfaction. Looking more closely at I.'s
understanding of P.'s statement, IIThere's the other
plumll , it is clear that this utterance is not taken
purely on its sentence-meaning. That is, it is not
interpreted purely on the basis of its propositional
content and sentence structure, but is rather res-
ponded to as a request for confirmation and elabora-
tion. The difference between these two interpreta-,
tions can be seen clearly if one considers
Griffiths' (1979) discussion of statements. Accor-
ding to him there are three important things about
statements:
their specific purpose is the communication
of information (the propositional content)
- this content is presented as true
the speaker should believe that the content
is likely to be news to his hearer.
Only the second ·of these applies to the utterance,
11 there 's ·the other plum ll • All the contextual
information relating to this utterance suggests that
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its specific purpose cannot be seen as the communi-
cation of information, nor can the speaker be
regarded as believing that the content of his utte-
rance will be news to his hearer. Clearly this is
some other form of communication than a statement,
and Grice's distinction between utterer's meaning
and sentence meaning indicates how this might be so.
It could be suggested that the adult responds with
confirmation and elaboration "simply because minders
tend to see themselves as general want satisfiers"
(Levinson 1983 : 282). The importance of some
motivation of this type must not be underestimated
in considering the facilitative role of the adult in
the process of language development. However this
aspect of the language-transmission partnership has
been given considerable attention in the literature
to date, and the aim of this study is to emphasize
the role played by the child. It is accepted that
it is because parents treat certain utterances as
requests, that young children are able to discover
the force of what they are able to utter (Griffiths
1979). However it follows from this that once this
discovery has been made, one can no longer view the
child as being unaware of the force of such utteran-
ces. It is with the child who has made this dis-
covery and is engaged in developing it and putting
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it into practice, that the present study is
concerned.
One other possibility which presents itself in exam-
ining instances of naming or stating, is that of
overlapping or dual purposes. The simplest example
of this can be seen in the distinction between the
intention to communicate and communicative intention
(Greenfield 1980). In any speech act (to use
Searle's terminology), both of these features will
be evident, although one is likely to be subordinate
to the other. In the young child in particular it
could be argued that his goal is often simply to
maintain communication, while attainment of the
mature speaker's goal is usually dependent on the
specific effect of his utterance on his hearer.
Nevertheless, provided the child is using language
/
and not just babbling, he will be maintaining com-
munication by means of the effect of his utterance
on his hearer, while the adult's intention to commu-
nicate is a necessary prerequisite for the fulfil-
ment of his communicative intention. If one talks
in terms of plans, one goal may be subordinate to
the other, yet both must be incorporated into the
plan if the main goal is to be attained. However
the idea of maintaining communication as a goal in
itself is only one example of this.
129
In the present study it was found that the use of
language to learn more about language often arose in
the course of pursuing another goal, for example:
I. Mm, that's
very exciting.





P. until, until that
- other part of
advent.
I.
P. You open this
door, door at
Christmas •.









Here the child's primary purpose is clearly to ans-
wer the adult's question effectively by providing
her with the relevant information. However in the
course of pursuing this goal, another sub-goal is
set up in the search for the word "Christmas". The
child pursues this secondary goal by using a
variation of the naming/stating strategy - being
unable to find the correct word, he sUbstitutes an
alternative description, which has the effect of
eliciting the word he was seeking. The inference
of this secondary goal is supported by what follows.
For the child's initial purpose is fulfilled in that
the required information is communicated to the
adult. Yet both adult and child continue the
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interaction in such a way that the child is provided
with, and takes up, the missing word.
In other instances a word may be overextended in the
attempt to communicate certain information, or to




I. What brown stuff?
P. That.
I. That - it looks
like a freckle.
See, I've got them
all over.
P. I've got one.
I. You've got one, and
you've got one on
your face there.
P. I haven't.
I. Yes you have.
P. No I haven't.
I. Yes you have.
Do you want to see?
P. No.
I. Okay.
[Short conversation between P.'s brother and I.]









P. Urn - eleven -
eleven blisters.








I. That's a freckle.
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I. See, like live
got all over my
arms. Freckles.
H. • s got hardly
any freckles.
H. live got a few.
I. Youlve got a few,
IlIIIl.
H. There and there.
I. Oh yes.









P.ls hesitation in answering I.l s question, "Whatls
eleven?" suggests a search for the appropriate word,
which is terminated by the offer of "blister", an
offer which has the definite appearance of a "best
guess".
Smith, Shoben and Rips' Feature Comparison Model
could be adapted to show how such a search might
operate (see Figure 4 below). While this study was
not generally concerned with the analysis of this
type of cognitive processing, the relationship
between semantic memory processes and verbal
information-gathering strategies is necessarily a
close one. The following analysis explores this
relationship briefly.
.
Figure 4 represents the two
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decision stages involved in the speeded verification
































Figure 4: The Feature Comparison Model of Smith,
Shoben and Rips (1974)
{in Lachman, Lachman and Butterfield
(1979 : 330)
Figure 5 indicates the possible stages involved in
the case of a young child deciding whether a name
may be appropriately applied to an object (for exam-
p1e, P. deciding whether the brown spot on his skin
may be called a blister).
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On locating such a word,
test by comparing all
features associated with
that concept, with those













Figure 5: Model of stages involved in determining
an appropriate name for an object
Smith, Shoben and Rips' model has been criticized
for failing to specify how the individual divides a
word's semantic features into "defining" and "acci-
dental" • ·However the theory is not designed to
show how the correct decision rule may operate. It
rather aims to account for the decision rules which
people actually use. and "a psychologically
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acceptable decision rule can be probabilistic, as
are elements of the theory by Smith et al."
Lachman, Lachman and Butterfield 1979 : 332). In
the case of the young child, the search of his
rather limited semantic memory is unlikely to be as
efficient as an adult's would be, and his decision
rules for selecting and comparing defining features
are probably equally crude. Nevertheless these
activities must be taking place, or the word "blis-
ter" would not be offered at all. In addition, the
speed with which it is offered indicates that the
crudeness is only relative to the adult since a
considerable degree of efficiency in these processes
must have already been attained.
The above interpretation is compatible with much of
Clark's account of the early development of meanings
. of lexical items in the Semantic Feature Hypothesis.
However, Smith, Shoben and Rips do not share the
view of defining features as a specific set of cri-
tical features, for which Clark has been criticized
(Atkinson 1982). Their theory posits flexible con-
ceptual structures and is therefore complementary to
Rosch's notion of prototypes (Lachman et al. 1979).
As suggested previously, this type of approach which
views semantic categories as based on degrees of
membership appears better able to accommodate the
complexity of semantic development.
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The goal of learning more about language is probably
more incidental here than in the previous example,
for P. does appear fairly well satisfied with
"blister" as the result of his search and seems
surprised ("Oh.") to be corrected. However his
attention does appear to have been at least par-
tially redirected to the question of naming and the
subsequent interaction conforms to the pattern of
the naming/stating strategy. P.'s utterance, "and
I've got one there", could well arise from his
perception of I.'s surprise at his initial statement.
For young children an adult's surprise at one of
their utterances must often signal that something is
wrong with their utterance and that communication
has been unsuccessful because of this. In such a
case saying, "and I've got one there", and pointing
to the thing in question, is a very effective way of
eliciting confirmation; correction or elaboration
and this is just how it is taken up by I. That the
child's attention has been directed to the question
of naming is further confirmed by his muttering,
11 freckle, freckle, freckle", to himself.
This repetition of words by the child was found to
occur frequently in all three subjects. In one
sense this may be considered an example of the use
of language to improve one's linguistic ability,
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whether through practice of sounds or through an
attempt to commit the word to memory. However it
was not included in the analysis as there is no
interaction, informative feedback or testing of
hypotheses involved.
Nelson (1973) suggests that:
Repetition can be conceptualized as practice,
as self-imitation, or as emphasis in the
service of communication.
(Nelson 1973 : 53)
However she concludes that the last aspect of repe-
tition is most characteristic of adult speech in
adult-child interaction, and thut the child's use of
repetition is usually best conceptualized as play.
She further notes that repetition, like imitation,
is most useful for language development during the
early stages of that process.
The naming/stating strategy identified in this study
is perhaps the most obvious example of what Nelson
calls "production":
When production is viewed as a strategy for
problem solving, it takes on the character-
istics of a match-to-sample game. In using
his available words the child (a) practises
their phonetic production, (b) tests his con-
cept domains against those of the language
users around him, and (c) uses the language
for communication purposes.
(Nelson 1973 : 46)
As with the present study, the aspect of phonetic
practice was not analyzed by Nelson.
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She addresses
herself to the general question of the function of
overt testing in linguistic progress and her data
are analyzed to determine whether a high response
rate (on the part of the child) is associated with a
faster rate of acquisition.
that:
She concludes simply
verbalizing a lot (in this situation)
appears to be a strategy that is positively
related to all aspects of learning to talk,
at least during the second year.
(Nelson 1973 : 47)
Production as described by Nelson is hardly a stra-
tegy in the sense used in the present study and as
she points out herself, her data do not make any
further conclusions possible (for example whether
production actually contributes directly to language
learning, or whether it can simply be said that a
high rate of production is typical of more advanced
talkers).
The establishment of directedness, conditions of
satisfaction and mutual understanding has been
described in some detail in the preceding discus-
sion. This having been illustrated, these
criteria will only be mentioned during the rest of
the discussion where a specific point is to be made.
(iii) METAPHORIC USE OF LANGUAGE
Another strategy which could be seen as a type of
production, depends on the metaphoric use of
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language. All three children were observed to use
this strategy, although differences in style were
apparent. "Metaphor" is used here in its more
general sense where metaphoric expressions are seen
as pervading all language, even the most literal
(Paivio and Begg 1981).
defined as:
Linguistic metaphor may be
••• the application of a word or expression
that properly belongs to one context to
express meaning in a different context
because of some real or implied similarity
in the reference involved.
(Anderson 1964 : 53, quoted in Paivio and
Begg 1981 : 274)
This strategy may be seen as a way of working to-
wards a mastery of language by "playing" with words
and their meanings. However it should not be
viewed simply as practice play, as repetition might
be said to be. For the metaphor strategy occurs in
the context of interaction and confirmation, and
correction or' elaboration from adults plays an
important role. Many discussions of play with
language focus on sound, word or linguistic struc-
ture practice in the context of monologue (e.g. Weir
1976 [1962]), for example where the child utters
strings of nonsense syllables when alone in a room,
or combines words and nonsense syllables arbitrarily
in a chant.
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The following example shows how the metaphor
strategy, on the other hand, takes place in the
context of communication:
N. Urn, I can see
moon.
M. Oh yes.
I. Oh there it is.
I. Really!
M. Ma. - oh I see,
you can catch.






Ma. I wanna show her.
[To Ma.]
N. Ja.
N. Then I'll bounce
it - ah **
I. You'll have to wait







Here the fulfillment of the criterion of mutual
awareness (in terms of meaning-nn) is particularly
evident in the way the adult takes up the metaphor.
This indicates to the child that she has perceived
and agrees with the similarities between the ball
and the moon, on which the metaphor is based.
Although all the strategies involve learning through
the manipulation of the verbal environment, this
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idea of learning through manipulation takes on a
particular focus in relation to the metaphor stra-
tegy. For, not only is the child manipulating the
verbal environment by certain patterns of word pro-
duction, he is also performing "internal" manipu-
lations on word meanings. The above example
suggests that N. is capable of identifying relevant
features of objects, not simply in such a way as to
be able to recognize or refer to those objects, but
in a way which enables him to manipulate or "play"
with the symbolic representations of these features.
In this way he is able to compare and match the fea-
tures of various objects, while still recognizing
these as different from each other.
It may at times be difficult to distinguish between
metaphor and overextension but a careful considera-
tion of contextual information reveals many instan-
ces where the child is clearly not overextending the
meaning of the word, for example:





P. I can throw as
hard as I can.
Throw therel
I. That's very far.




P. I get another
rock.
P. It's a stick
rock.
I. That's a funny
looking rock.





In several instances of the use of this strategy,
directedness proved difficult to establish, and the
adults' understanding of and response to the child-
ren's utterances proved of particularly valuable
assistance for the analysis. This appears to be a
more complex strategy than the first two discussed
(and may in fact comprise a number of potentially
distinguishable strategies), and many of the clues
to its accurate interpretation are probably too
subtle to be easily captured on audio-tape, let
alone in a written transcript.
In most instances the metaphor strategy is used by










Ma. It's a bottle
of muti.
I. A bottle!?
















I. I see that, now
itls not a
bottle any more.
The following example from the same context shows
how the childls metaphor may be rejected by an
adult:













I. What is it now?




I. Itls a rubber band?!
Doesnlt look like
anything to me.
This type of activity on the part of the child is
comparable to Piagetls notion of imaginative or
symbolic play, which is distinguished by him from
the practice play of the sensorimotor infant and the
rule-governed play of the older child: Symbolic
games depend on a comparison between a given and an
imagined element and therefore require representa-
tion of an absent object. Also implied is make-
believe representation, since the comparison is
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"distorting assimilation"' (Piaget 1962 : Ill), as
opposed to the generalization involved in concept
formation.
However in most instances the metaphor strategy does
not appear to conform to piaget's view of play as
lithe extreme pole of assimilation of reality to the
ego", even though he does allow that it "has
something of the creative imagination which will be
the motor of all future thought and even of
reason" (Piaget 1962 : 162).
This incompatibility arises from piaget's view of
symbolic play as situated firmly within a particular
stage of development, that is at the beginning of
representational thought. Piaget makes it clear
that he is referring to a particular type of sym-
bolic play, the typical make-believe games of the
young child. Apart from examples such as the last,
the type of play with symbols which is involved in
the metaphor strategy is more like Piaget's notion
of constructional or creative games in the sense
that these:
are not a definite stage like the others,
but occupy, at the second [representational]
and more particularly at the third [reflective]
level, a position half-way between play and
intelligent work, or between play and
imitation.
(Piaget 1962 : 113)
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Perhaps even this fails to do justice to the impor-
tance of a strategy involving the metaphorical use
of language • It has been argued that metaphor is:
••• the distillation or essence of what is
creative about creative thinking. Joking,
imaginative play, dreaming, and even percep-
tual naming: all may be regarded as built
essentially on the human capacity for metaphor.
(Sharratt 1983 : 18)
Elements of several of these activities appear to be
involved in P.'s use of the metaphor strategy, for
example:
P. Who are Catherine
and Anthony?











M. Yellow like who,
P. Like paint.
P. Mm.





P.'s use of the metaphor strategy, as illustrated
here, often bears a remarkable similarity to Ke11y's
way of testing hypotheses about language (Horgan
1981) • The above example may be based on some per-
ceived but unexpressed similarity, or it may be 'an
instance of the type of violation of semantic
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categories described by Horgan. Certainly it is
regarded as humorous by both P. and his mother.
This points to an important function of play as a
way of achieving mastery within a context where
reality is suspended to a certain extent. In the
context of play and joking the child may practise
and manipulate language without the normal conse-
quences of being shown to be wrong. These consequ-
ences may not appear very threatening to an adult,
but often are to a child - consider N.'s distress at
his brother's insistent correction when he named a
rabbit a mouse (see p. 170).
Bruner's account of the functions of play refers to
this minimizing of the consequences of one's actions
which enables the child to learn in a "less risky"
situation (1976 : 38). Related to this is the
opportunity which play offers the child, to tryout
combinations of behaviour (and semantic relations)
which would be unlikely to be attempted under
functional pressure (Bruner 1976 [1972]).
That this type of language game was encouraged by
(and in fact probably originated from) P.'s parents
is evident from interactions initiated by the
parents themselves, for example:
P •••• have things
on my feet.
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F. All right, I'll
put things on
your feet for you.
P. Urn, then I'll
walk in the T.V.
room.





F. Do you want
banana skins on
your feet?
F. Oh. What sort of
things do you
want on your feet?
F. Sandals, okay,
sandals it'll be.
You go and find
your sandals.
Since P.'s father is a linguist, the similarity to
Kelly's language testing strategies is perhaps not
so remarkable, for a focus on language and its play-
ful manipulation is a central part of the environ-
ment for both children., This focus can also be
seen clearly in the other strategies attributed to
P.
Paivio and Begg, who believe that metaphor is an
area seriously neglected by psychologists, suggest
that the reasons for the use of metaphor must be
pragmatic, "referring to the verbal behaviour of
individuals in communicational contexts in which
metaphor must serve some essential functions"
(Paivio and Begg 1981 : 273). They suggest that
metaphor is an efficient way of conveying continuous
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experiential information using a discrete symbol
system. If this is accepted as an important
function of metaphor in the context of adult commu-
nication, it seems likely that metaphor would be a
useful way for children to explore ways of making
the connection between continuous experiential in-
formation, with much of which they are familiar,
and the discrete symbol system of language, which
they are in the process of learning. The follow-







N. I call -
N. Yes.
I. Mm.





This rather startling connection becomes clearer on
considering that there are ony two groups of "caged"
animals to whom N. pays daily visits. Both the
chickens at the bottom of the garden and the silk-
worms in their lidded shoebox, tend to head for
freedom as soon as N. opens the door to the run or
the lid of the box respectively. Knowing that he
is not supposed to let the animals out, his typical
response is "down".
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This example also illustrates very clearly the
importance of Nelson's warning that:
The child may direct his attention to
situations ignored by the parents: he
may form concepts based on relations
salient to him which are not coded by
the adult language.
(Nelson 1974 : 279)
It is obviously necessary for a theory of concept
formation to account for the incorporation of
functional-relational information into the deve10p-
ing concept. This is of course why Nelson and
others reject theories such as C1ark's (1973) which
focus almost exclusively on the coding of
perceptual-descriptive information.
A careful consideration of memory factors would be
necessary to understand how metaphors are developed
and the metaphor strategy put into operation. In
fact metaphor is studied by cognitive psychologists
i~ terms of the field of semantic memory, since
metaphor is seen as a problem of meaning requiring
the association of information in long-term memory
with the terms of the metaphor (Paivio and Begg
1981). Clearly both the construction of metaphors
and the use of the metaphor strategy will depend on
the efficient operation of working memory. It is
here that information reactivated from long-term
memory can be compared with incoming perceptual
information and manipulations and abstractions
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performed. The resulting metaphor can then be
expressed and tested against incoming feedback from
a mature speaker. Again this testing process would
take place in working memory, with additional infor-
mation being called up from long-term memory as
necessary. This is of course similar to what hap-
pens in the use of any of the strategies, but the
manipulations are probably more complex here.
A serious problem which was encountered in relation
to the identification of instances of this strategy,
was the difficulty in distinguishing its use from
imaginative play not involving 'the gathering of
linguistic information. Often, as in the following
example, both the child and the others with whom he
is interacting, appear to be focusing on language:
[N. cups his hands, holding a small lump of
plasticine]
N. Look a little
tiny nest.




N. * .look. at those
poor little -













N. Who wants to
come in?












Ma. Will he flyaway?
N. Ee - ja!
He flow away.
Up in the tree.
Ma. I wanna see him.












N. Look - parrot
back inside
here.
Isn't he in the
nest any more?
You think it are!
[N. makes
a noise]









I. Oh, back inside
there now.
I. Must be pretty
squashed.
Ma. I want to see it.
Ma. Hum! I ate the
parrot up.
Ma. You can make
another parrot.
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M. Ah. N., can you
and Ma. do this
puzzle?




N. In, that's my
ballie.
Ma. No, your nest.
N• ' n , , n , where's
my parrot, my
* parrot?
I. You can make
another one.
N. Mm.
Ma. He's just a bluff
bluff - he's just
a bluff bluff
parrot.
I. What d'you say to
that, N.?
N. Tisn't a bluff
bluff parrot.
I. What is it then?
N. It's a big
parrot.
Ma. Is it a real one?
N. Jal
Tisl
Ma. Ha, a - thought you
were going to say
ja tisl
N. Made a big crab.
Made a big crab.
Made a big crab.
M. A big crab?
N. Ja.
However, many exchanges which may well have involved
instances of the metaphor strategy were excluded as
being difficult to substantiate. This was parti-
cularly the case with P., where both the investiga-
tor and her colleague believed there to be many
instances of the use of this strategy, but
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insufficient information to distinguish these from
other types of imaginative play. Another reason
for excluding several possible instances of P.'s use
of this strategy, was the context in which they
occurred, that is, P. being read to by an adult,
while both looked at the book. This was an act-
ivity in which he engaged regularly and which was a
context of rich and varied conversational exchanges.
However P. was very familiar with most of the books
read and during analysis it became clear that many
of his utterances were probably repetitions of com-
ments made on previous occasions by adults or by his
brother. This is something which it is always
extremely difficult to control for, but some attempt
could be made to do so by providing a child with
material which his caretakers believe to be novel to
him.
Since the production of metaphor can be so difficult
to identify in young children, it is understandable
that most of the psychological studies in this field
have tended to focus on comprehension rather than
production, just as Horgan (1981) notes studies of
the development of linguistic humour have done.
While an understanding of how metaphors are proces-
sed and comprehended is very important, it is equ-
ally important to understand their function in both
child and adult speech. From the examples given,
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it seems one function of metaphor production is the
testing of newly acquired meanings in a communica-
tive interaction.
(iv) SELECTIVE IMITATION
Selective imitation is defined, following Snyder-
McLean and McLean (1978), as spontaneous, immediate
and overt verbal imitation of anotherls utterance/so
All three children were found to imitate all or part
of anotherls preceding utterance in this way to
elicit confirmation that they had heard and reprodu-
ced the utterance correctly, for example:
(a)
Ma. Il m mixing it. [Biscuit
mixture
M. Aha, got it. in a bowl]
Ma. Il m mixing it.
N. Mixing it.
I. Therels a bit on
your side there
N.
M. Look at all that
flour down there.




I. Ha! Look at these
eyes!
Ma. Here, Illl show
you whatls in that
book.
I. Theylre funny, hey.
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N. That's a mousie.
(c)
P. That's my ruler.
Ma. There's some more
eyes.
I. Mmhm.
I • Look at your
fingers, M.l Hm?
Ma. No.
I. Turn it this
way so N. can
see too. Come
and sit here.
I. Mmhm. ** the
rest of it.
Ma. ** no more.






Ma. But there's -
I. I'm tangled up








I. And this is?
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This activity is not really considered to constitute
a strategy for testing hypotheses about language
(Snyder-McLean and McLean [1978] make this point
when they distinguish it clearly from metalinguistic
utterance production). For this reason, and be-
cause it is not regarded as an important means by
which language may be used to enhance the child's
linguistic ability, selective imitation will not be
discussed in as much detail as the three preceding
strategies.
Nevertheless, selective imitation is one way of
using language to improve one's understanding of
language and unlike the child's repetition of his
own utterances, it does take place within the con-
text of communication. It arises out of another's
communicative intent, and although not usually well
integrated into the conversation, may form the basis
for further interaction as in example (b) above.
This example does in fact show some of the
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characteristics of the hypothesis-testing strategies
in its directedness and conditions of satisfaction.
Another such example follows:
[N. is engaged in interaction with M., where objects
are being picked out of a basket, named and commen-
ted on. ]




M. Oh, that's a tiny
one. Must be for
a small dolly.




M. What is this?
It is interesting to note that selective imitation
is not used a great deal by any of these children,
the most regular use being by the youngest child
(N. 2, 39: Ma. 0, 67: P. 1, 51 ) • This finding could
be explained by Nelson's conclusion that tIle useful-
ness of selective imitation as an "accommodative
strategy for the problem of acquiring and expanding
vocabulary entries" (Nelson 1973: 51) does not carry
over to the period when the child is engaged in
sentence building (from about twenty-four months).
This notion of an accommodative strategy is derived
from Piaget's concept of accommodation, and Nelson
distinguishes it from that of an advancing strategy.
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Selective imitation never appears to function as an
advancing strategy for language development, that
is, it does not operate as a mechanism for acquiring
new and more complex linguistic structures (Clark
and Clark 1977).
However Snyder-McLean and McLean (1978) cite evi-
dence which suggests that imitation is a particu-
larly effective strategy for furthering a child's
mastery of words with which he is already familiar,
and conclude that children will only imitate utter-
ances (or parts of utterances) which have some
meaning for them.
Snyder-McLean and McLean (1978) also cite several
other studies from which they conclude that while
overt, spontaneous verbal imitation does not appear
to be a necessary nor a sufficient factor in lan-
guage development, the systematic and strategic
nature of this normal accompaniment to early lang-
uage development is greater than "previously
recognized" (Snyder-McLean and McLean 1978 : 313).
This "previously recognized" refers to the psycho-
linguistic tradition in the study of language deve-
lopment, since the behavioural learning theorists
saw imitation as playing a central role in language
learning. In fact the theoretical controversy
between linguists and psycholinguists on one hand,
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and the proponents of behaviourism on the other, is
typified by their respective views on the role of
imitation in language development. In pointing out
the creative nature of language, Chomsky showed how
associationist principles fail to account for the
fact that we can understand and produce sentences we
have never heard before. S-R conditioning theories
of language necessarily give considerable weight to
repetition and practice in language learning, and
therefore have great difficulty in accounting for
the potentially infinite number of sentences which
the mature speaker can produce or understand
(Lachman et al. 1979).
One of the earliest and most conclusive arguments
against assigning a central role to imitation was
put forward by Brown and Bellugi (1964), who noted
the frequency in early language of such utterances
as, "A this truck", "You naughty are", and "Put a
gas in."
It may well be, as Snyder-McLean and McLean (1978)
suggest, that the study of covert and deferred imi-
tation is important for an understanding of the
dynamics of language development. However the
methodological difficulties inherent in such a
project are rather daunting.
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2.2.3 INDIVIDUAL STRATEGIES
It was suggested in Part I that individual differ-
ences were likely to play an important role in the
aspect of language development under study, and in
fact not all the language testing strategies identi-
fied were common to all three children.
N. AND MA.
N. and Ma. were found to use two strategies in addi-
tion to those discussed previously. It is not
really surprising that these two strategies are
shared by the brothers but not by P., given the
assumption expressed earlier about the caretakers'
role in developing such strategies. However one
might expect some individual variations between the
brothers in the use of these strategies.
(i) ASKING QUESTIONS NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO WORD
MEANINGS OR NAMES
On the initial scan of the data it was noticed that
both children frequently asked questions such as,
"where is x" in situations where the context sug-
gested that a direct question about names or mean-
ings would have been more appropriate. On closer
analysis, the interactions surrounding many of these
questions were seen to conform to a similar pattern,
the main elements of which are:
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An impression of the question as being inappro-
priately phrased (as evaluated by the investiga-
tor during analysis).
Evidence of directedness in pursuing an under-
standing of a certain word.
Conditions of satisfaction suggesting that the
required information related to naming or word
meaning rather than the type of information
apparently requested.
Response from an adult indicating that the ques-
tion was at least partially interpreted as a
request for information about names or meanings.
For example:
(a)
N. Mummy, where -
where'd that
come from?





M. Mm. What d'you
do with a funnel?
N. I don't know.
M. Yes you do, what
do you do with
a funnel?
Ma. Look here, I did
that one!
[Change of topic for approximately ten minutes.]
M. What do you need






M. What do you - when
you sit in your
bath, what do you
put in the funnel?
Do you put water?
N. 00.
M. You going to put




M. You can if you want
to.
In this example the mother clearly interprets the
interrogative utterance, "Where'd that come from?"
as a request to provide a name for the object and
goes to some lengths to elaborate on this.
(b)






M. Pour it in a
cup?
M. It looks as if
it's got goggas
in it, N. No,
it's old, N.
M. It's got goggas













Although directedness cannot be established in this
example, the mother's explanation of the term
"goggas" shows that N. was perceived as not having
understood the term. "Why " does seem to be an in-
appropriate follow-on from two explanations as to
why the nuts are being rejected. In addition, N.'s
purpose appears to have been satisfied once the term
"goggas" has been substituted with more familiar
words. However this last point cannot be conclu-
sive, as the child has also been offered a substi-
tute for the original packet of nuts. Were his
purpose to oppose his mother's rejection of the
nuts, this offer of a substitute could well present
the conditions of satisfaction for that purpose.
Nevertheless, taken together with other similar
interactions, this type of question does appear to
constitute a strategy for eliciting more information
about word meanings. Another example follows:
[M. is reading to N. and Ma. from a book.]












Yes, what's it lives next
called? What door]





















M. No - cuckoo,
cuckoo.











M. In his house.
Ma. Mum, read me this
one •
M. • •• he loved his
little donkeys
cause they used
to play - Meenie,
Mynie and Mo.




















M. He hasn't got




Ma. That cuckoo *.
M. I think it's in
his toy cupboard.
Again the overall context of this interaction sequ-
ence suggests that the sought-after information is
not really related to the physical location of the
cuckoo clock, as the form of the question would
imply. Certainly the child's purpose is not satis-
fied by the reply, "in his house". Directedness is
very clear, since a considerable amount of inter-
action intervenes between the question and its reap-
pearance. The idea (Greenfield 1980) that the best
conditions for establishing intention are when feed-
back is not quickly forthcoming, is clearly borne
out here. The mother, who is usually quick with an
acceptable response, fails to provide the required
information, probably because of the distraction of
reading. This failure leads to repetition of the
same question several times, thUS' clearly establish-
ing directedness. Because of this failure presen-
tation of the conditions of satisfaction does not,
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of course occur, but as a result of the length of
the interaction and the constant repetition of the
same question form, certain possible conditions of
satisfaction can be ruled out.
Memory plays a particularly important role in this
interaction and one can infer that N.'s working
memory is engaged throughout in attempting to
understand the meaning of cuckoo clock. Even when
distracted from his questioning to look at the book,
the strategy itself appears to be retained in
working memory, and operates on the new problem of
identifying the donkeys. However once the original
problem reasserts itself it appears to have changed
form, probably because the unfamiliar words "cuckoo
clock" could not be encoded properly. What remains
is the familiar word which the child himself intro-
duced into the interaction in his initial attempt to
grasp the meaning (and sound) of "cuckoo clock".
When the strategy is again put into operation with
this familiar word, it leads to what appears to be
more satisfactory feedback, although the mother may
just have been more persuasive in her introduction
of a new topic. This would perhaps support
Searle's idea of intention-in-action (Greenfield
1980), since there is obviously no clear representa-
tion of the conditions of satisfaction which could
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endure through the diversion. Alternatively this
representation of the conditions of satisfaction may
simply have been rudimentary and incomplete because
of the child's age. Ma., however, remembers the
initial thrust behind the question and appears dis-
satisfied on N.'s behalf with the conclusion of this
interaction. This is interesting because Ma. con-
sistently showed a clear understanding of N.'s
utterances and their intentions, and on several
occasions during the study was observed to interpret
these for his mother or the investigator.
One might argue that, although the children's
purpose does appear to be to elicit information
about word meanings, the use of such questions is
simply the result of an incomplete mastery of WH-
questions. That it is in fact a strategy in its
own right may be argued on the basis of the idea
that directly language-oriented questions are not
necessarily an adaptive way of learning language
(see the above discussion on such questions).
A question such as, II what's that?lI, may elicit a
fairly brief and not necessarily informative
response, for example a name. This did appear to
be the pattern with N. & Ma.'s mother. On the other
hand, a question like, "why is X?II, will usually
result in more informative feedback, since a very
brief answer is not as likely to appear acceptable
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here, even to the adult. Such a question will also
evoke more elaboration if it is perceived as inap-
propriately expressed. In addition, questions of
the Ilwhere is X?ll type, asked in the context of
adult-child conversation, are more than likely to
result in the object being pointed out to the child,
and this is a very good source of information.
(ii) N. & MA. : ARGUING/DENIAL
The last strategy to be attributed to N. & MA. could
not be established as satisfactorily as the others,
but deserves discussion in terms of its theoretical
interest, for example:
[The mother has been teaching the children to Ilread ll
by recognizing individual words printed in large
letter on cards.
this game.]
Here she has been demonstrating










M. It's not leg.
It's mouth.
[Laughing]
While not strictly an instance of testing word
meanings, this example does show how arguing or
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rejecting information can effectively elicit further
clarification. The imitation of "it's a mouth"
suggests that this is the information sought by the
child, who appears satisfied on receiv~ng it.
Such arguing or denial of information provided by an
adult may be used by the child who finds that
information insufficient for his understanding.
Acceptance of such information is far less likely to
lead to further elaboration on that subject than if
the child were to argue about it, for example:











I. What's it for?
I. It's for play-

















ton they use a
shuttlecock, and
when they - ja -
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Although there was a reasonable number of sequences
which appeared to fit this formulation, directedness
and conditions of satisfaction were not easy to
establish and other intentions could have accounted
for the patterns of interaction, for example:
N. That's a mouse.
N. Mm.
[picture of




N. Thai tis a
mouse.
I. Is it a mouse?
N. Mm.
I. It's got a tail
like a bunny
rabbit.
N. No, tisn't a
bunny rabbit.
It's a - it's a
ma, ma, ma, m -
mouse.







In this example the rejection of feedback could well
be motivated purely by the child's need to assert
his opinion against that of his elder brother.
Perhaps the accompanying emotion is a clue here,
since most instances of arguing were fairly good-
natured and often terminated on the provision of
further information.
The following example combines naming/stating with a
type of argumentation characteristic of the nursery
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school-going child, but unfortunately -lacks present-
ation of the conditions of satisfaction which would
make it easier to interpret.
Ma. Look, look what
happens.
M. Oh, it picks
them up.









Ma. You are a
magnet.
M. Mm mm.
Ma. You are a
magnet.






Although there were several other such interactions
involving each child, this type of interaction can-
not, in the absence of the two confirming criteria
of directedness and conditions of satisfaction, be
adequately established as a strategy for testing
hypotheses about language. Nevertheless it is
interesting to speculate on the intuitive usefulness
of such a strategy.
Both this strategy and the last appeared to be used
to gather other types of information as well as lin-
guistic information. This supports the view that
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language learning is closely linked to other types
of learning (Donaldson 1978).
(iii) MA: - "00 YOU KNOW ••• ?"
A further strategy was identified for Ma. This may
be a variation on the naming/stating strategy and
was included in this for the purposes of summarizing
the results.
The initiating utterances associated with this stra-
tegy are prefaced with, lido you know ••• ", "you
don't know 11• •• I "don't you know ••• ", or "you know
what ••• ". The clue to this came from a failure on
the part of the investigator to provide the required
feedback, as Greenfield (1980) suggested would be
the case:
(a)











Ma. Do you know what
I drink out of?
I. What?
Ma. Every time I
drink juice?
I. What?








I. A glass! Gosh
that's very
smart.
Ma. I don't drink




This is another example of dual or overlapping in-
tention, since one intention is clearly to impress
the investigator with a recent step towards adult
status. However various contextual clues point to
a second, if subsidiary goal, that is confirmation
of the correct use of the word lI gl ass ll. The first
of these clues comes from the overall pattern of the
interaction which is seen to be similar to other
instances of language hypothesis testing, and to
those typical of this strategy in particular.
Secondly an overview of all interaction involving
this child shows a preoccupation with testing out
lImaterial ll words (see p. 191). The different uses
of the word lI g l ass ll are of particular interest as
the child's surname is Glass. In addition the
hesitation with which the word is produced suggests
that feedback would be welcome.
The following example shows clearly how the child
may use the word quite correctly without being con-
vinced that he understands its meaning fully:




Ma. Mum I want to
ride in the
go-cart.
M. Do you, well why
don't you sit in
in the go-cart
and ask N. to
push you, and
then you give N.
a turn. You put
him in the go-
cart and 'then
ask - and then
you push him.
Ma. Do you know which
is the go-cart?






Ma. Yes, that thing.
M. And I can see •••
• • •
[As M. goes towards the go-cart to pull it up]















I. It's not going
anywhere.
M. It's a still cart.
Ma. It's a bus!
I. It's a bus?
Ma. Ja.










The last part of this sequence provides an interes-
ting example of metaphor and the way in which this
may be taken up and elaborated by adults.
A similar pattern was also observed to be associated
with the preface, "I think ••• " or "I thought
that ••• ", as in the following examples already
cited elsewhere:
Ma. I thought it was
a elephant.













M. No, Mummy said
he ••• it's
glass and next
time it might break.
On several occasions during the study a child was
observed to use two or more different strategies in
a sustained effort to test out a particular language
hypothesis. This was the case with the first of
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the above two examples, which was also cited during
the discussion of naming/stating. This is an added
factor in establishing directedness, since one can
note Bruner's "sustained direction of behaviour" in
the deployment of different means.
This type of strategy bears some resemblance to an
indirect speech act. In an indirect speech act the
sentence uttered does not have the surface syntactic
form usually associated with the general class of
il10cut~onary acts to which it belongs semantically,
for example:
"I must ask you to move your car."
"Let me say that the attorney general may
have acted unwisely."
(Davison 1975)
However the indirect speech act still relies on 1in-
guistic convention for its correct interpretation by
the hearer, whereas the strategies just outlined
depend on a more individualised use of language.
Successful communication between the child and an
adult unfamiliar with the strategy, will therefore




(i) TAKING UP A WORD AND USING IT IN THE SAME
CONTEXT, BUT NOT AS REPETITION OF AN ADULT'S
UTTERANCE
P. was frequently observed to incorporate a word
just used by an adult into his conversation, over
and above what one would expect in the normal course
of adult/child conversation.
(a)
[Po and I. are looking at a book with a picture of
an alligator]








I. So that it can





P. Mm, mm, ja.
I. And then it can
see you. It wat-




















peep out of the
water.
I. They will do, bIn.
P. Uh , urn -
I. He looks as though
he's standing on the
sand here though, not
in the water, but if
he were in the water,





P. And he would just
watch the frog.
I. He watches the frog.
P. Mm.
I. His eyes on the side
of his head, so that
it can watch - he can
see you coming, he
can see the frog




[A couple of minutes later, looking at another
picture]
P. His eyes are just
peeping out.
I. Yes, these ones are
too, aren't they?
P. Yes.
I. But they've got all
their heads out.
P. Mm.
I. Their whole heads
out.
P. Yes, like that.
P. Yes.
Like that.







I. Take your hands
off your eyes?
P. Mm.
And he puts his
eyes on the side
of his head like
that.
I. Mm - he doesn't
put them there,
they just happen






I. Well it's an
animal a bit like
that, only much
smaller, and it's
got eyes on the
side of its head.
Directedness is very clearly established here,
although conditions of satisfaction are not as easy
to pinpoint. Long-term memory can be seen to play
an important role, since many different conversa-
tional topics intervene.
(b)
M. Ja, she brings
the giant ones
in from outside.














[P. goes to answer the telephone and comes back'.]





P. My, my cat brings
in the giant ones.
I. She does - your
mother was just
saying.
P. Muffin brings the
giant ones in the
house.
I. From the garden?
P. Mm.
(c)
[The cat, Muffin, jumped over P.'s back.]
P •••• she went off
my back.




My back - then
she was stand-
ing on by back.

































P. Doesn't prick my
back.
I. Oh, I see.
Only sometimes.




























I. Ja, that's right.
I. Well, they don't
usually slip up,
they usually have
to be pulled up.








Directedness is also well established in the
following examples, where a direct request for an
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explanation of word meanings constitutes part of the
interaction:
(e)
P. Whatis a gutter?
I. He's hiding in
the gutter.
I. It's this - you





I. That's what the gutter's
for.







I. On the edge of
the roof, there's
a bit shaped like
this, see that bit
shaped like this,
that's the gutter.
I. On the very edge here.
You see, it's shaped
like a bowl, only
long.
I. And then what happens
is when the rain falls
on the roof it falls
goes down the roof,
cause the roof slopes,
it goes into the gutter,
see, look it goes all
the way down here, all
the way round here, it
all catches in the gutter,
cause the gutter's shaped
like that, and it comes
down here, and it comes
down this pipe, and the
water goes out here.
So the gutter's to
catch the rain.
I. Because you frightened
him with your gun.
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P. Mm.
But now he's dead
in the gutter.
I. Oh, is he?
( f)




P. I'll connect it.
I. All right, well
mind me, I'll get
out of the way
first.·..






out of his cage.
The bird's going to
unconnect its cage.












P. Undo the wire?







P. I disconnect it.
I disconnect it.
I. Thatls right, now
itls disconnected.
P. Ja.
I. You did it.
Now connect it up
again.
P. Okay.
1 1 11 see what
1 1 11, Il m going
to see what
1 1 11, Il m going
to do. The bird's
tying its cage
up with its wings.
Wings.
I. Wings, oh.
P. There we are.



















(See Appendix B for the full transcript of this
sequence.)
P.'s parents' concern with language and its correct
use may account for this child's persistence in
testing out word meanings over relatively long
periods of interaction, and in spite of the intru-
sion of various other topics of conversation.
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(ii) TAKING UP WORDS AND APPLYING THEM TO
DIFFERENT TOPICS OR IN DIFFERENT CONTEXTS
A variation on this strategy involves P.'s incor-
poration of part of an adult's utterance into his
conversation, using it in a different sense, or in
the case of an adjective, to qualify a different
noun, for example:
(a)
P. You can bounce it








I. Not with the
frog, silly,
with the balloon.
P. This is a silly
frog to be a
ball.



















I. What makes yeast?
P. Urn, red and
blue makes
white.
F. Red and blue
doesn't! Red and
blue makes purple.
P. Yes, the blue
will come into
purple.




Although the focus on citing this example is on the
use of the word "makes", it is interesting to note
the father's concern with pronunciation, and P.'s
play on the word "yis".
(d)











P. Urn, urn, Dad and
I got the Daily
News.





In view of the suggestion that a child's caretakers
play a central role in the developing of language
testing strategies, it is interesting to note the
following interaction between P. and his mother:














M. Yes, he is, and
I don't want you
to go in there,
he is fast asleep.
Although conditions of satisfaction proved difficult
to establish in many of these interactions, evidence
of directedness and other contextual factors suppor-
ted the inference of these two strategies. In par-
ticular the fact that together they constituted a
consistent pattern of interaction which appeared to
be typical of that child, suggested some functional
value. It is to illustrate this that a large
number of examples have been included. Given the
parents' concern with language, this functional
value is more than likely to relate to enhancing the
child's linguistic ability, which supports the conc-
lusion that these patterns of interaction are part
of a language testing strategy.
2.2.4 WORDS TESTED REGULARLY THROUGHOUT THE STUDY
So far the discussion has focused on certain strate-
gies used by each child to test their hypotheses
about the meanings of different words. However it
was also noted that a child would appear to be
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striving for a full understanding of a particular
word or concept, on various occasions during the
study. This preoccupation with the meanings of a
certain word illustrates the active involvement of
the child in his language development. It shows
how different strategies may be applied to the
search for the full meaning of a word.
For example, both N. and Ma. show a preoccupation
with understanding "material" words such as "metal",
"glass", "wood", and "clay". In particular N.
frequently attempts to increase his understanding of
"metal". As well as being observed directly during
the investigation, this was reported by Ma., who
says:
Ma. Do you know what N.
says?
I. What's he say?
Ma. He says, he, every
time when he comes
to me and talks to
me, he says "my
neck made of metal".




"My eyes made of metal."
I. Why does he say that?
An example from the data recorded illustrates this:
N. Look.




I. Is that your Mum's
dolly?
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N. No, it's Ma.'s
dolly.
I. 00 - crash!
M. Don't break her.
N. This dolly made
'n metal.
I. Made of metal?
N. Mm.





In this particular example the statement, IIthis
dolly made 'n metal ll , appears to derive from N.'s
hypothesis about the properties of metal and its
primary function may be to reject his mother's
warning that the doll might break.
However, taken in the context of many other inter-
actions on the topic of IImaterials ll , this sequence
suggests how hypotheses about word meanings may be
formulated and tested.
I. No - why won't
it work there,
Ma.
Ma. I donlt know.










Ma. For this to
pick up.
[Note: N. is present during this exchange.]
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Ma. is seated in the playroom, surrounded by many
toys and other objects, many of them metal. His
request may therefore be seen more as a request for
the identification of metal, as opposed to non-metal
objects.
This interaction is followed within a couple of min-
utes by the "do you know what ••• " sequence referred
to on p. 172, suggesting that the investigator1s
distinction between metal and glass has been taken
up in two ways, firstly in seeking for help in
distinguishing metal objects from other objects, and
secondly in introducing "glass" into the conversa-
tion in terms of one of its known uses - a glass to
drink out of, as opposed to a mug.
The following sequence is from the next session, a
week later:
N. Look, this kanga-
roo does pick
up.
M. Oh, it does pick
up!
N. Mm.
M. What1s it made of?
N. Metal.
M. Oh, it can only
pick up if it1s
made of metal, hey?
Two weeks later the topic of "glass" is again intro-
duced, this time in a very different context:
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I. I'm not sure why,
I've had it for
such a long time -
[Interaction interrupted by N.]
(see also p. 173 : Ma. "l thought it was glass".)
And the following week:
M. What did I make
at pottery, N.?
N. Some, some glass!
M. Some glass.
N. Mm, some pots.
M. Some pots.
He keeps asking, 11 is this 11 ,
tap, tap, tap, "gl ass ?
Is this glass? Is this
glass?" You know, I have
to explain each thing in
turn: lino, that's urn, clay,
and that's plastic, and
that's" - I suppose because
we keep saying, lino, be
careful, that's glass, don't
break that." I· explained to
them today, I made it with
clay and then they put it in
the oven and baked it and
it turned into pottery.
This last comment provides some useful contextual
background to the following interactions, which took
place earlier on in the same session:
Ma. Is it clay? [Ma. , N. &
M. Pardon? mother are
Ma. Is it clay, or making
playdough? playdough]
M. Playdough.
N. Is it clay?
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Ma. Do you want
some playdough?
N. Yes. .
(Note the minimally informative response evoked by
this type of question.)
Also in the same session:





N. Mum, I finished.
M. Finished with
your playdough?
N. Yes, put it in
the oven.








Ma. Why is it brown?
I. Cause it's got
dirty on the
way down.
M. It's picked up
all the mud.
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In this way Ma. has established that colour is not a
defining feature of the substance called playdough,
whereas texture is (soft, unlike clay, but not too
sticky, as at the stage before it becomes
playdough) •
At the end of this session, Ma. turns once more to










M. Well, yes, I
suppose it is,




how you use them.









Ma. So they're both
the same.
It is interesting to note that N. and Ma. share this
concern with understanding the meanings of words
such as "metal", although they are over a year apart
in age and at correspondingly different stages in
their language development. It seems that Ma.'s
understanding of such terms, while more complete
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than N.'s, is still not fully comprehensive. This
supports the idea that a child will gradually estab-
lish the boundaries of a word's meaning by testing
various hypotheses.
The above examples illustrate very clearly the
active role of the child who is striving after a
full understanding of word meanings. The ability
of even the youngest child to remember and to mani-
pulate various aspects of word meanings, is central
to this activity.
This learning about words and their meanings is
inextricably linked to concept formation and
although the child may initially acquire semantic
structures to fit concepts, the further development
of conceptual knowledge is likely to be largely
language dependent (Nelson 1974).
Another example is drawn from Ma.'s attempt to
define the criteria for the distinction between
"boy " and "g irl":
( a)
Ma. Is this a girl
or a boy?










I. This - Esprit's the family's




I. How can you tell?
Ma. Yes, how can you
tell that?






Ma. Puppy's a boy.
Boys are much
stronger.
(b) Three weeks later:









a girl and -
my nanny's a
girl.
And N.' s a girl
and I -
No, N. 's not a
girl.










Ma. Three and three.
I. Mml
(c)
Ma. Got a sore foot
and she's
limping.
I. Oh, poor girl.
Ma .. See.
I. Poor girl.





Is he a girl?
I. Chocolate Mouse -
Ma. Is he a girl or
a boy?
I. I think he's a
boy.
Ma. Yes, he is a
boy.
A particularly interesting example concerns N.'s
attempts to master the use of the words "other" and
.. another" • This is interesting because it illus-
trates so clearly how a child can use a word on many
occasions in its appropriate context without having
a full grasp of the meaning and use of the word.
On most occasions this lack of understanding will
not be apparent to the mature listener, but at times
it is exposed. As the sequences relating to this
example are rather long, they have been detailed in
Appendix B.
This type of relational term is a complex one to
master and may be used in appropriate contexts for
some time before full understanding is attained.
One is reminded of Piaget's insistence that it may
be misleading to make inferences about a child's
understanding of the world from the way he talks.
The example of young children's use of time words
and expressions is often cited here, since they are
able to use words such as "Saturday", "yesterday",
and "next week" in many different appropriate
contexts, without the corresponding understanding.
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Other meanings regularly tested by N. are noted in
the Summary of Results.
The method of collecting the data (i.e. one session
a week) was not particularly well suited to explo-
ring this aspect, although the wide spacing of ses-
sions makes the directedness of this activity, when
observed, very apparent. Certainly those instances
recorded do do give considerable support to the view
of the child as actively testing various hypotheses
about word meanings.
2.2.5 GENERAL DISCUSSION
The aim of the study was achieved in that several
verbal information-gathering strategies were iden-
tified, including four which were common to all
three children. This preliminary identification of
strategies proved a difficult task, since clear
guidelines for doing so are hard to formalize.
Regularities based on sentence-type are perhaps the
most easily recognized. This was the basis on
which the first strategy, dependent on the use of
interrogative utterances concerning language, was
identified. However it was noted in discussing
this, that sentence-type provides an incomplete
access to utterer's meaning, which can only be accu-
rately interpreted in terms of overall context.
197
The identification of the strategy of naming/stating
relied more heavily on utterer's meaning as inter-
preted in terms of directedness, conditions of
satisfaction and mutual understanding. This was
clearly an important strategy for all three children
(N. 7,95: Ma. 6,36: P. 7,61, see Table 1). It is
quite possible that there are individual differences
in the way children employ this strategy, and there
may even be various distinct but related strategies
involved here, as appeared to be the case with Ma.
However it would be no simple task to develop a
method of analysis which would enable one to make
these finer distinctions.
In general the naming/stating strategy appears to be
particularly well substantiated. The instances of
its use were fairly readily identified and satisfac-
torily established in terms of directedness, condi-
tions of satisfaction and mutual understanding,
which was not always the case with the metaphor
strategy and some of the individual strategies.
The conclusion that these children used metaphor to
enhance their understanding of lang~age does appear
to be a valid one. However metaphor is a more
complex phenomenon than question-asking or naming
and stating, and individual instances of its use as
a verbal information-gathering strategy are
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correspondingly more difficult to identify and sub-
stantiate. A further problem is the relatively low
rate of metaphor production in young children. It
may well be that this strategy only really comes
into its own at a later stage in development.
Identification of the individual strategies was
based on various forms of regularity, with clues
even being provided by specific words or phrases,
for example Ma.' s use of the words "you know ••• ",
and 11 I thought".
The fact that all utterances involved in the use of
verbal information-gathering strategies only consti-
tuted a small proportion of each child's overall
speech production is only to be expected. So many
of a child's utterances are taken up with exclu-
sively practical concerns such as expressing various
physical needs or desires, and even those utterances
which have a primarily mathetic function may be
directed towards a number of diverse concerns, of
which word meaning is only one. For this reason,
further investigation of the use of verbal
information-gathering strategies would require the
collection and detailed analysis of a very large
number of utterances from many children. The use
of data collected by others is not recommended ·for
this purpose, as the investigator's familiarity with
the families and her participation in the
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interac~ions was found to be invaluable in the iden-
tification of strategies.
The analysis of the data suggests that the first
four strategies discussed may be common ways for
children to use language to improve their mastery of
language. However it must be emphasized that no
generalizations can be made on the basis of this
study, which was designed to investigate the hypo-
thesis that such strategies do occur, and to iden-
tify examples of different strategies. The ques-
tion of which strategies are the most common or most
effective, remains one for future research. What
can be said is that there do exist some individual
differences in strategies and that these individual
differences appear to derive largely from different
parental emphases or patterns of interaction.
The fact that two of the subjects were brothers
meant that fewer individual strategies were identi-
fied than might otherwise have been the case.
However this choice of subjects did serve to indi-
cate the parents' influence on the development of
these strategies. This influence should not be
underestimated, although the focus of the study has
been on the utilization, rather than the initial
developing, of the strategies.
200
The conclusion that different children may use dif-
ferent strategies has important implications
for remediation, especially if certain strategies
can be shown to be more effective than others. It
is interesting that much of the motivation to study
the dynamics of language development comes from
those concerned with problems and retardation in
this field (e.g. Snyder-McLean and McLean 1978, Lund
and Duchan 1983). It is extremely difficult to
develop and carry out efficient ways of collecting
the necessary data and even more problematic to
develop satisfactory ways of analyzing or inter-
preting it. The fact that the coding system was
applied by two people independently does help to
achieve some measure of reliability, but it is easy
to see why many investigators feel that it is diffi-
cult to study with sufficient rigour the active role
played by the child in language development.
Nevertheless, it is important to make the attempt to
understand this role. For without some understan-
ding of this aspect it is extremely difficult to
develop efficient methods for assessing problems and
for remediation.
A specific limitation of the present study was the
reliance on typewritten transcripts and contextual
notes. This was partly alleviated by the fact that
the investigator was present at all sessions and had
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participated in the interactions. Much of the type
of contextual detail which is difficult to formalize
could therefore be drawn on in the interpretation of
the data. Video recordings would provide a more
comprehensive record and would be particularly use-
ful in reaching intersubjective agreement. The
tape recordings were also available for information
about intonation, pitch etc. A formal analysis of
this aspect of interaction was not included, but
could prove a useful source of evidence in future
studies.
As Lyons (1981) points out, only the verbal compo-
nent of an utterance is medium-transferable, but
non-verbal features such as intonation, stress-
patterns, tone of voice, loudness, rhythm and tempo
are all equally relevant to the determination of an
utterance's meaning.
The study was conducted on the basis of weekly
visits, which usually took place at the same time of
day on the same day of the week. Since it was not
designed as a longitudinal study of development, it
might have been better to have made the sessions
follow on more closely from each other. This would
have increased the contextual information available
to the investigator and may have provided more of
the type of evidence discussed in section 2.2.4.
However even those studies having the investigator's
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own children as subjects cannot provide all the
contextual information necessary to ensure accurate
interpretation of the interactions. It is always
difficult, for example, to tell with any certainty
whether a metaphor is an imitation of another's
utterance (possibly even an imitation distorted by
imperfect memory) or an original production.
2.3 CONCLUSIONS
All three children were found to make use of
language in order to learn more about language.
Specifically, they were found to use various stra-
tegies by means of which they were able to enhance
their understanding of word meanings. Four of
these strategies were common to all three children,
while two were shared by N. and Ma. only, and two
were specific to P. Even in the case of N. and Ma.
individual differences were found in the use of the
two strategies which they shared. Consideration of
these strategies supported the idea that a child's
caretakers play a central role in their development.
N. and Ma.'s preoccupation with testing the meanings
of certain words throughout the course of the study
further supported the notion of children as actively
involved in testing hypotheses about word meanings,
and indicated how a child may use a word or phrase
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APPENDIX A : MCSHANE'S CATEGORIZATION SYSTEM
REGULATION CATEGORIES : Utterances attempting to






















STATEMENT CATEGORIES : Mainly utterances making a
























Excludes giving in the
context of requesting

















Conversational responses and conversational initia-
tions. These categories, unlike the others, con-·
cern the relations between the utterances of the
























Utterances in which the intention can be recognized,
but which do not fall within one of the other cate-
gories e.g. "hallo", "bye-bye".
(Adapted from McShane, 1980 : 73-79)
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APPENDIX B : ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPTS, N. AND P.
N. : "0ther 11 and "another 11
(i)




















I tell you what -
I. There's one.
N. No.
I. Oh no, he belongs
to that -
M. Here you are, N.,
come sit this side,
bit close to each
each other there,
here you are, then
you won't bump each
other.




N. That other man
with, with a
car.
M. He's already riding
in his car.
N. This racing car?
M. Mm.
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[Here, while N. appears at first to be using the
term "other" correctly, the overall context suggests
that his understanding of this term is incomplete.
Since he cannot recognize the "other man" when he
sees it, but has to ask for confirmation from his
mother that this is in fact the "other man", it
appears that he lacked an initial representation of
the concept of the "other man".]
N. (ii)













Ma. No, not here.
Ma. Put that around
like that.





Ma. Yes. But where's
another moon
shape? Hey?
I. I can see another
one, N. , can you?
N. Mm.
























I. What is it?
Ma. It's a bunny
rabbit. 'n I
see, I see him
on T.V.
I. What's his name
when he's on T.V.?
Ma. I don't know.
I. On the other side?

















I. Isn't that the same
one?
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Ma. * It's the same one.
I. Mm, I thought so.
What's that wheel, N.?
[Here again, N.'s use of the term lI another ll appears
. to be correct, until it finally becomes clear that
he is applying it indiscriminately to any moonshape,
and fails to distinguish lIanother ll from lithe same ll .]
Approximately five minutes later:





N. I made, made a
moonshape.






P. : IIdisconnected ll
[Po is playing a game with a long piece of wire,
which he has tied up to a cupboard at both ends. He
pretends to be a bird in a cage, by standing inside
the loop made by the wire from one cupboard door to
another. I. is sitting on the bed II reading ll and
talking to P.]
I. Whoops, look what
you've done to the
wire. It's come
disconnected.
P. I'll connect it.
I. All right, well mind
me, I'll get out of
the way first.
P. **
I. It's copper wire,
isn't it?
P. Ja, copper wire.
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I. Mm.




I. It's not really sticky,
it's quite smooth,
maybe there's some-
thing sticky on it.
P. It's the wire
that's sticky.
I. Do you think so?
The copper? Well, it
could be.
P. This has been
disconnected.
Let's get in.
I. What're you inside,
a cage?
P. Mm.
I. Are you an animal
at the zoo?
P. Mm.
I. What are you?
P. Tiger1




P. I'm a bird.
I. Oh, you've shrunk,
you're smaller now
you're a bird.














to fly out of
its cage. The
bird flew out of
its cage.
I. And flew away?
P. Ja.
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I. Well, what did
you mean?
P. I don't know.
Wings.
















I. From where? Where
did you get it
from?
P. I don't know.
I. Didn't you get it
from school?
P. No.
Heee - broke the
net.
I. Who broke the net?
P. Me.
There's a differ-
ent way of fix-
ing it.











P. Undo the wire?
P. I disconnect it.
I disconnect it.
I. Oh dear, H. won't
be very pleased.
I. He doesn't mind?
I. Oh, that's lucky.
I. Disconnect it means
to undo it.
I. If that wire comes
disconnected, then
it comes away from
the other side, it
comes undone.
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